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LEGITIMATE FAMILIES AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
KATHARINE K. BAKER* 
Abstract: This Article questions whether and why it should be unconstitu-
tional to treat legitimate and illegitimate children differently. It argues that le-
gitimacy doctrine is rooted in a biological essentialism completely at odds 
with contemporary efforts to expand legal recognition of nontraditional par-
enting practices including same-sex parenting, single parenthood by choice, 
surrogacy, and sperm donation. The routine invocation of legitimacy doctrine 
by advocates purporting to help nontraditional families is thus at best ironic 
and at worst dangerous. Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy cas-
es reveals that liberal Justices, in trying to dismantle marriage—a legal con-
struct—as the arbiter of legitimate parenthood, presumed that a biological 
construct—genetics—was a superior arbiter. These Justices either did not real-
ize or did not care that the biological determinism driving the impulse to pro-
tect illegitimate children could actually undermine a more progressive family 
law doctrine. Validating nontraditional family structures requires an embrace 
of law, not blood, as the arbiter of parenthood, and thus requires a very tem-
pered reading of the legitimacy cases. Such a reading mandates that the state 
be consistent in how it determines parenthood, but does not require the state to 
recognize genetic parenthood. The power to define parenthood, which the 
conservative Justices felt comfortable leaving to the state, is best kept with the 
state, so that the law is able to break free from heteronormative family forms. 
INTRODUCTION 
Why is it unconstitutional for the law to treat legitimate and illegiti-
mate children differently? This Article argues that usually it is not, but in 
recent federal same-sex marriage litigation, amici briefs repeatedly argued 
that legitimacy doctrine requires courts to use heightened scrutiny in evalu-
ating marriage laws because such laws can render children illegitimate.1 
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 1 See Brief of Amici Curiae Carlos A. Ball, Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers Univer-
sity et al. in Support of Petitioners at 17–23, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 
14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); Brief of Amici Curiae Family and Child Welfare Law Profes-
sors Addressing the Merits and in Support of Respondents at 29–30, United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307); Brief for Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights 
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The invocation of legitimacy doctrine in support of same-sex marriage 
is deeply ironic. The amici seem to suggest that what makes a legitimacy 
classification problematic for Fourteenth Amendment purposes is that it 
treats the children of married parents differently than the children of unmar-
ried parents.2 But why should the state treat the children of married and 
unmarried parents alike? Because both groups are children with no control 
over “the circumstances of their birth”?3 That cannot be right. Almost all 
children’s entitlements in this country, from child support to intestacy rights 
to social security payments, are based on who their parents are and what 
their parents do, or did, or have never done. Children’s life circumstances 
and legal entitlements are based on the fortuity of their parents’ earned or 
inherited wealth. Therefore the problem with legitimacy doctrine cannot be 
that it treats some children differently from others. It must be instead that it 
draws distinctions between children who for some reason should be treated 
alike. 
When finding in favor of illegitimate children, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s legitimacy cases assume that legitimate and illegitimate children are 
“alike” and thus entitled to comparable treatment because they share a ge-
netic source. Hence, the irony: to rely on a doctrine that posits distinctions 
between the genetic offspring of the same “parent” as invidious is to reify 
the natural, biological, and necessarily heterosexual family. It is, to para-
phrase the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003’s Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, to “single[] out the one unbridgeable differ-
ence between same-sex and opposite-sex couples” and make that the es-
                                                                                                                           
of Children in Support of Respondent Edith Windsor Addressing the Merits and Supporting Af-
firmance passim, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Scholars of the Constitu-
tional Rights of Children in Windsor]; Brief of Amici Curiae Joan Heifetz Hollinger et al. in Sup-
port of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance at 27, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.) 
(No. 13-4178), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Brief of Amici Curiae Family and Child Wel-
fare Law Professors in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment Below at 19–20, Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-
2214) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Family and Child Welfare Law Professors challenging DO-
MA]; Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Gitanjali Deane & Lisa Polyak, et al. Amer-
ican Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers[,] American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Maryland 
Chapter at 30–31, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44), abrogated by Oberge-
fell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Ass’n at 4, Andersen v. 
King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (Nos. 759354-1, 75956-1), abrogated by Ober-
gefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 2 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Family and Child Welfare Law Professors challenging DOMA, 
supra note 1, at 20 (“[C]reat[ing] a new class of ‘illegitimate’ children who can be denied the 
federal marital protections that affect children because of the circumstances of their birth to, or 
adoption by, married same-sex couples . . . . cannot survive equal protection review.”). 
 3 See id. at 19. 
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sence of parenthood.4 This Article examines these legitimacy cases in order 
explain why they are dangerous precedent for those concerned about 
reimagining the heteronormative paradigm for parenthood. 
It is easy to dismiss the importance of legitimacy doctrine today be-
cause it is so simple to use genetic connection to establish a parent-child 
relationship.5 The problem that seemed to give the U.S. Supreme Court the 
most pause in the legitimacy cases, difficulty in proving a paternal genetic 
relationship,6 has now disappeared, as DNA tests are increasingly available 
and affordable.7 Yet the elimination of proof problems has done nothing 
other than highlight the core normative questions that the Court never re-
solved in the legitimacy cases. Genetic science has made questions of legit-
imate parenthood harder, not easier, because it is so clear to most courts that 
issues other than genetic connection must be relevant to questions of 
parenthood.8 
The liberal Justices who championed the rights of illegitimate children 
in the legitimacy cases likely thought they needed to dismantle an archaic, 
moralistic system that linked legitimate parenthood to marriage, but all they 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (“The ‘marriage 
is procreation’ argument singles out the one unbridgeable difference between same-sex and oppo-
site-sex couples, and transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage.”). 
 5 The law school curriculum usually pays short shrift to legitimacy doctrine. Constitutional 
and family law casebooks and professors typically provide only a brief summary of the doctrine 
before moving on. See LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 896 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing all 
of the legitimacy cases in less than a page); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 673–75 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing all of the legitimacy cases in three pages). If given, that 
summary usually goes something like this: After batting the issue back and forth in a string of 
cases during the 1960s and ’70s, the Supreme Court finally determined that illegitimacy is a semi-
suspect class and therefore illegitimacy distinctions are subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
 6 See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) (discussing the “peculiar problems of proof” in-
volved in paternal inheritance); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976) (discussing the admin-
istrative burden of determining children’s entitlements on a case-by-case basis); Weber v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174–75 (1972) (discussing “uncertain claims of parenthood”). 
 7 See, e.g., DNA Test Specimen Collection Locations, UNIVERSAL GENETICS, http://www.
dnatestingforpaternity.com/locations.html [http://perma.cc/J2PM-GE9N] (promising reliable and 
affordable DNA testing services in all fifty states). 
 8 For a sample of the kind of difficult questions that arise: What of the marital father who 
discovers that his wife had an affair, and the five-year-old daughter whom he has loved and sup-
ported is not genetically related to him? See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 
(Iowa 1995) (estopping a wife from denying her husband’s paternity during their divorce ). What 
of the sperm donor who is sued in paternity even though the recipient of the sperm promised she 
would not ask him for child support? See, e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007) 
(enforcing the parties’ agreement not to seek child support from the sperm donor). But see Bud-
nick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding an agreement not to seek 
support unenforceable as against public policy); In re A.B., 444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) 
(refusing to allow genetic parents to sever the parental rights and responsibilities of a biological 
father through contract). What of the same-sex partner who never had any pretense of genetic 
connection to a child, but has loved and reared the child as a parent does? 
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knew to replace that system with was a parenthood regime based on genetic 
connection. The conservative Justices were far more willing to let the state 
make judgments about who should be considered a parent. This Article ar-
gues that the liberals’ parenthood regime, rooted in genetics, is more trou-
bling than that of the conservatives, which was based on a purely legal con-
struct. 
Part I of this Article introduces the major legitimacy cases.9 This takes 
some time and patience with detail. The detail is necessary, however, in or-
der to avoid the kinds of traps into which the Justices fell when deciding 
these cases. Part I explains how very sympathetic fact patterns produced a 
ten-year tennis match of sorts with conservative and liberal Justices batting 
the ball back and forth in what were usually close decisions.10 Both sides 
won some lasting points. The liberals succeeded to the extent that legitima-
cy classifications now receive some form of heightened scrutiny.11 The con-
servatives succeeded to the extent that administrative convenience and the 
finality of property distribution, both of which are concerns found in almost 
all cases, can now be sufficient state justification for a categorization of le-
gitimacy.12 Part I concludes with observations about the light that the battle 
over illegitimacy sheds on the tradeoff between using fundamental rights 
and suspect classification doctrine in constitutional family law.13 That 
tradeoff was recently on display in the different ways federal courts ap-
proached the same-sex marriage question.14 Thus, the legitimacy cases are 
relevant to the same-sex marriage debate, but not for the reasons that many 
amici suggested.15 
Part II demonstrates how the most common reading of the legitimacy 
cases—that the state must treat nonmarital genetic (“illegitimate”) children 
of a particular adult as it treats the marital (“legitimate”) children of that 
adult unless there is a compelling reason not to—is not the only or the best 
interpretation of this confusing line of cases.16 Section A of Part II discusses 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 20–169 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 20–153 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 20–153 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 20–153 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 154–169 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–05 (discussing the relationship between fundamental 
rights and equal protection with regard to marriage). Compare Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 
(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage violated the fundamental right 
to marry), and Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193 (finding a fundamental right to marry), with Baskin v. 
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that laws banning same-sex marriage discriminated 
against a minority class without a rational basis), and Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(treating the same-sex marriage issue as discrimination against a semi-suspect class). 
 15 See infra notes 154–169 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 170–228 and accompanying text. 
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how reading the legitimacy cases as elevating the importance of genetic 
connection overstates the holdings of the cases as written.17 Section B then 
examines how elevating the importance of the genetic connection also un-
dermines numerous contemporary doctrines that treat as legitimate a variety 
of non-heteronormative parenting practices, including same-sex parenting, 
single parenthood by choice, surrogacy, and sperm donation.18 Part III 
demonstrates how it is possible to read the legitimacy cases in a manner that 
does not thwart modern parenting practices, but only by recognizing the 
state’s power to define parenthood as it wants, subject to minimal constitu-
tional constraint.19 The power that many of the conservative Justices felt com-
fortable leaving to the state is best kept with the state, lest arguments from 
biological essentialism play too prominent a role in defining parenthood.  
I. THE LEGITIMACY CASES 
Between 1968 and 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a rapid se-
ries of constitutional challenges to the statutory treatment of illegitimate 
children.20 At the end of those ten years, legitimacy appeared to emerge as a 
classification subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.21 This Part unpacks those cases. 
A. Legitimacy and the Right to Recover: Levy and Glona 
The first two Supreme Court legitimacy cases, decided on the same 
day in 1968, involved Louisiana’s wrongful death statute.22 Under Louisi-
ana law, nonmarital children who had not been legally acknowledged by a 
“parent” were ineligible to sue in tort for the wrongful death of that “par-
ent,” and a “parent” of a nonmarital, unacknowledged child was ineligible 
to sue for the wrongful death of that child.23 
In 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana, five nonmarital, unacknowledged sib-
lings who had been denied the right to recover sued, challenging this stat-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 170–179 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 180–228 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 229–242 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 22–153 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 154–166 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
68 (1968); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (Supp. 1967). 
 23 See Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 16 So. 2d 594, 596 (La. Ct. App. 1943) (dis-
cussing Louisiana’s wrongful death statute, which states that “[c]hildren referred to in this law 
include only those who are the issue of lawful wedlock or who, being illegitimate, have been 
acknowledged or legitimated pursuant to methods expressly established by law”), aff’d, 22 So. 2d 
842 (La. 1944); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (granting the right to recover damages 
caused by the actions of another to the “children” of the deceased). 
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ute.24 No doubt, the statute effected an extremely harsh result. Five innocent 
children were left without any financial redress and a tortfeasor escaped all 
liability simply because the deceased had not been married at the time she 
gave birth to the children.25 If the deceased had been married, to anyone, at 
the time of the children’s births, or if she had legally acknowledged the 
children,26 they would have been entitled to collect for the wrongful death of 
their mother. The lower Louisiana court found that denying these children 
the right to recover for wrongful death was nonetheless rationally related to 
the legitimate state interest in the “health, morals, or general welfare of the 
people,” because it “discourage[ed] bringing children into the world out of 
wedlock.”27 
Writing for the Supreme Court majority, Justice William O. Douglas 
disagreed. He noted that the case might have involved both fundamental 
rights stemming from an “intimate, familial relationship”28 and an “invidi-
ous classification,”29 either of which might trigger more exacting judicial 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because 
of his birth out of wedlock? . . . These children, though illegiti-
mate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured 
them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual 
sense . . . . We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against 
them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly 
relevant to the harm that was done the mother.30 
There are two points worth noting about this pivotal passage. First, de-
spite the list of qualities that seemed to make Ms. Levy’s children “hers” 
just as legitimate children would be, the majority clearly was not mandating 
that Louisiana allow a niece or nephew or neighbor’s friend whom Ms. 
Levy nurtured, cared for, and let grow dependent on her to also collect for 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See 391 U.S. at 69–70. 
 25 See id. at 68–70. 
 26 Louisiana had a process that allowed putative genetic parents to formally and legally 
“acknowledge,” or register, their legal connection to a child. See id. at 79 n.7 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (citing the Louisiana acknowledgement statute). Acknowledged children were not always 
treated identically to marital children, but they were treated as being in a legally recognized rela-
tionship with their parents, which entitled them to certain benefits from those parents. See Labine 
v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 533–35 & nn.1–3 (1971) (explaining various ramifications of the Loui-
siana acknowledgment provisions). 
 27 See Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966), writ refused mem., 193 So.2d 
530 (La. 1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 68. 
 28 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. at 71–72 (footnote omitted). 
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her wrongful death.31 It was only because these children were presumed to 
be Ms. Levy’s genetic issue that the Court concluded they were similarly 
situated to children who would have been eligible to collect. Second, the 
invidiousness of the distinction could not stem from the fact that the chil-
dren’s conduct was irrelevant to the harm done to Ms. Levy. Wrongful death 
claimants’ behavior is always irrelevant to the harm caused; they recover 
simply because of their legally recognized relationship to the deceased. 
The second of the Court’s 1968 legitimacy cases, Glona v. American 
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., involved a comparable illegitimate 
relationship and a comparable windfall for a tortfeasor.32 Because Ms. Glo-
na, the (presumably) genetic mother of the deceased child, was not married 
when the boy was born and had not legally acknowledged him as “hers,” 
the tortfeasor owed her no duty of care with regard to her son. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the denial of benefits without 
even a mention of why the exclusion of illegitimate children was rational.33 
Justice Douglas, again writing for the majority, invalidated the statute 
handily: 
[W]e see no possible rational basis for assuming that if the natural 
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegiti-
mate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It would, in-
deed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate chil-
dren so that they can be compensated in damages for their death.34 
The majority in both Levy and Glona was unconvinced that denying 
recovery in these situations would serve as a disincentive for nonmarital sex 
or as encouragement to marry. The only evidence that the state seems to 
have offered in support of its rationale was a history of discouraging such 
illicit behavior.35 The state did not demonstrate any nexus between the clas-
sifications at issue and their ability to discourage immoral behavior.36 In 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Ms. Levy may have been particularly likely to be nurturing toward children who were not 
her genetic issue because, as one scholar explains, kinship in the African-American community 
often does not track biology. See Dorothy Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 214 
(1995) (“[B]lood ties are less significant to the definition of family in the Black community than 
they traditionally have been for white America.”). 
 32 See 391 U.S. at 73–74. 
 33 See Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 391 
U.S. 73 (“[T]his Court is clear to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit 
States from classification but only prohibits classification upon an unreasonable basis. It cannot be 
said that the classification here by the Louisiana courts is unreasonable.”). 
 34 Glona, 391 U.S. at 75. 
 35 See id. at 75–76. 
 36 See id. 
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Glona, the majority was so unconvinced of a nexus that it struck down the 
statute as irrational, without any more exacting scrutiny.37 
Justice John Marshall Harlan, in a four-Justice dissent written in re-
sponse to both Levy and Glona, could not offer any proof that the treatment 
of illegitimates served the state’s interest in morality and public welfare, but 
neither did he think such proof necessary. He was “[a]t a loss to understand 
. . . [the majority’s conclusion that] the State must base its arbitrary defini-
tion of the plaintiff class on biological rather than legal relationships.”38 
According to the dissent, children are entitled to be treated as related to cer-
tain adults when the state decides they are so entitled. Parenthood is a ques-
tion of law, not fact. 
The majority provided a brief paragraph in response, pointing out that 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the Court to scrutinize the law: “[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw 
such ‘legal’ lines as it chooses.”39 Parenthood may be a question of law, but 
that law must be written and applied in a way that protects all citizens 
equally. 
Usually, the Equal Protection Clause only demands serious review of 
the legal lines drawn by legislatures when there is a fundamental right or a 
suspect class involved. As the Levy majority suggested, legitimacy distinc-
tions might run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause for both reasons.40 
First, by drawing lines around who is related to whom, the state was inter-
fering with “intimate familial relationship[s].”41 Perhaps the state must be 
particularly careful not to be arbitrary when it regulates intimate family re-
lationships. Second, the historical treatment of illegitimate children may 
suggest that courts should be wary of statutes that treat them poorly. Per-
haps classifications based on illegitimacy should be treated the same as 
statutes based on race, because in both cases legislatures have a long and 
ugly history of discriminating against those groups without justification. 
The Levy majority cited King Lear to highlight the long and unjustified 
history of prejudice against illegitimate children.42 There is no doubt that 
for hundreds of years, people who had been born to unwed mothers who 
never married their (presumably) genetic fathers were treated differently 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See id. 
 38 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 79 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 39 See Glona, 391 U.S. at 76. 
 40 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 70–71. 
 41 See id. at 71. 
 42 See id. at 72 n.6 (“Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well com-
pact, [m]y mind as generous, and my shape as true . . . ?” (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING 
LEAR act 1, sc. 2 (Candace Ward ed., Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1994) (1608))). 
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under the law. In England, illegitimates were not allowed to inherit, nor 
were they allowed to bequeath to anyone but their own children.43 They 
were considered filius nullius, or children of no one.44 
The Levy-Glona dissent ignored this history of illegitimacy and elided 
any discussion of whether legitimacy should be considered a suspect class, 
but the dissent’s critique does highlight a critical assumption in the majori-
ty’s position: biology matters. Any statute that delineates entitlements based 
on family relationships must draw distinctions based on who is family. 
Those delineations will inevitably be arbitrary unless one believes that cer-
tain relationships, like those based on biology, must be considered familial. 
If there are no relationships that a legislature is required to consider famili-
al, then presumably the legislature is free to draw the lines between family 
and nonfamily, or takers and nontakers, wherever it wants, unless in doing 
so it is discriminating against a suspect class.45 
B. Labine and Weber: The Critical Cases 
The next two cases, decided within a year of each other, lay out the 
tension at the core of all of the legitimacy cases. In 1971, in Labine v. Vin-
cent, the Supreme Court upheld Louisiana’s rank discrimination against 
illegitimate children in the context of intestacy, explicitly deferring to state 
determinations of family status for purposes of property distribution.46 In 
1972, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Court used more exact-
ing scrutiny to strike down Louisiana’s workers’ compensation scheme be-
cause it afforded legitimate but not illegitimate children rights to collect.47  
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Alan Macfarlane, Illegitimacy and Illegitimates in English History, in BASTARDY AND 
ITS COMPARATIVE HISTORY 71, 73 (Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1980). 
 44 See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971). In medie-
val central Europe, illegitimates could not hold public office, testify in court, or leave property to 
anyone other than their legitimate dependents. The common law tended to be more accepting of 
illegitimates than were civil law jurisdictions. See id. 
 45 If biology need not be determinative of family, then the Louisiana statutory scheme was 
arguably not arbitrary at all. It allowed parents to acknowledge children, and with that acknowl-
edgement both child and adult could sue for the wrongful death of the other. The system can be 
justified as one that assigned parenthood based on voluntary legal commitments of the adult. 
Adults either got married, thereby committing themselves to the parent-child relationship for chil-
dren born to the marriage, or they acknowledged certain children and thereby legally committed 
themselves to that parent-child relationship. The state bound itself to recognize the parent-child 
relationships that the parents signed up for, but not necessarily those relationships that the adults 
“lived” but did not register. This regime would not be problematic unless it was impermissible to 
ask the genetic parents of a nonmarital child to take a step—formal, legal acknowledgement—that 
parents of marital children did not have to take. 
 46 See 401 U.S. at 538–40. 
 47 See 406 U.S. at 175–76. 
1656 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1647 
The illegitimate child in Labine was formally acknowledged by both 
of her unmarried “natural” parents within two months of her birth. Her 
acknowledged father, Mr. Vincent, died when the child was six years old, 
leaving behind considerable property but no will.48 Under Louisiana’s intes-
tacy law, the acknowledged child could inherit from the deceased only if 
there were no collateral relations.49 
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the 5–4 majority, distinguished Labine 
from Levy by noting that the wrongful death provision at issue in that case 
sounded in statutory tort.50 The Court suggested that in creating “a large 
class of persons” who could recover for the tort in Levy, the state could not 
“totally exclude from the class of potential plaintiffs illegitimate children 
who were unquestionably injured by the tort.”51 This is an odd way to dis-
tinguish Levy. The state defines the large class of persons who can take in 
intestacy as well. It is not clear why the cause of action under which the 
illegitimate child claims a right should matter if the constitutional problem 
is with the legitimacy classification itself. Moreover, illegitimate children as 
an entire category were not discriminated against in Levy—acknowledged 
illegitimate children were able to collect under the wrongful death statute. It 
was the statute that was upheld in Labine that discriminated against all 
nonmarital children. 
After (barely) distinguishing Levy, the Labine majority highlighted 
how the Louisiana legislature “carefully regulated many of the property 
rights incident to family life.”52 But unlike the Levy majority, which empha-
sized how anything related to family life might need to trigger added scruti-
ny,53 the majority in Labine suggested that anything dealing with property 
should trigger deference.54 All of the legitimacy cases deal with property 
entitlements that flow from family status. Whether a court should put a 
thumb on the scale for the side of deference because it is property, or on the 
side of scrutiny because it is family, is the critical question. A 5–4 majority 
in Labine thought it more appropriate to emphasize the finality of property 
rights. 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Labine, 401 U.S. at 533. 
 49 See id. at 534. Mr. Vincent had no wife, no other children, and no parents, but he did have 
relatives who, under Louisiana’s intestacy statute, were entitled to take before his acknowledged 
daughter. See id. The Labine statute thus made a distinction between marital children and nonmar-
ital children, whether acknowledged or not. The statute in Levy had made no distinction between 
legitimate and acknowledged children on the one hand and unacknowledged children on the other. 
 50 See id. at 535–36. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 536. 
 53 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. 
 54 See Labine, 401 U.S. at 537–39. 
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Louisiana did, at the time of Labine, have a particularly comprehen-
sive set of rights and obligations associated with family status. Unlike most 
states, children had obligations to their parents and were also entitled to a 
forced share at their intestate parent’s death.55 In addition, as the Court not-
ed, Louisiana had “a complex set of rules regarding the rights of illegitimate 
children.”56 Although acknowledged illegitimate children, like Ms. Vincent, 
had some intestacy rights if there were no collateral heirs, unacknowledged 
illegitimate children had no intestacy rights, and in some instances fathers 
were even barred from bequeathing them property in a will.57 This is rank 
discrimination against illegitimates, but it is also a relatively rational way of 
keeping unsavory facts (for example, infidelity) secret, and encouraging 
testators to provide for their marital children.58 Paramount in the Labine 
decision was the fact that the Louisiana rules did not just discriminate 
against illegitimates, but also “against collateral relations, as opposed to 
ascendants, and against ascendants, as opposed to descendants,” as well as 
“in favor of wives and against ‘concubines.’”59 Confronted with such an 
array of discriminations, the Court employed a very deferential standard of 
review. 
The dissent accused the majority of ignoring the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s mandates: “The conclusion the Court appears to draw from its itemi-
zation of other discriminations among a deceased’s relatives is that Louisi-
ana needs no justification at all for any of the distinctions it draws.”60 That 
idea, said the dissent, “flies in the face . . . of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses.”61 The dissent is certainly correct that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires courts to scrutinize some legislative distinctions, but 
what does mere rationality—much less heightened scrutiny—look like in 
intestacy? In general, intestacy laws are thought to try to mimic presumed 
testator intent, but the freedom legislatures have to presume and at times 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id. at 536. 
 56 See id. at 537. 
 57 The idea of barring someone from bequeathing something in a will may sound like a severe 
restriction on the right to transfer one’s property, but the entirety of the Louisiana intestacy stat-
ute—because it derived from continental traditions—is much more restrictive of property rights 
than most state codes. Since feudal times, continental European testators had much less freedom to 
ignore family members than did British testators. This made the definition of family potentially 
more important on the continent than in England. See infra notes 103–109 and accompanying text. 
 58 Discrimination against illegitimates may seem less pernicious when it is done in the name 
of protecting the “legitimate” property expectations of the marital family. See infra notes 103–109 
and accompanying text. 
 59 See Labine, 401 U.S. at 537–38. 
 60 See id. at 549–50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 61 See id. at 550. 
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override that intent is considerable.62 Is it rational to prioritize (likely inde-
pendent) adult children over (likely more needy because they are elderly) 
parents? Most intestacy statutes do.63 Is it rational to put adopted siblings 
before blood relations? Many intestacy statutes now do, but the treatment of 
adoptive children varies considerably among the states.64 What about a niece 
by marriage over a niece by blood? Whose viewpoint is the state empow-
ered to prioritize in the case of illegitimate children: the presumed wishes of 
the testator, or the presumed wishes of his marital children? 
Equal protection doctrine indisputably prevents a state from prioritiz-
ing white relatives over African-American relatives. The dissent in Labine 
thus understandably focuses on the “suspect classness” of illegitimates to 
invalidate the statute. Justice William J. Brennan accuses the majority of “up-
hold[ing] the untenable and discredited moral prejudice of bygone centuries” 
and suggests that the majority’s position is comparable to “answering a com-
plaint of Negro school children against separate lavatories for Negro and 
white students by arguing that the situation is no different from separate lava-
tories for boys and girls.”65 More curiously, the dissent suggests that making 
any classification between marital and nonmarital children is suspect be-
cause “the formality of marriage primarily signifies a relationship between 
husband and wife, not between parent and child.”66 
From a family law standpoint, this is an odd comment by Justice Bren-
nan. For most of history, marriage has been the arbiter of parenthood. The 
marital presumption of paternity predates any law allowing a man to be 
sued for paternity outside of marriage by at least one thousand years.67 Men 
were considered fathers because of their position as husbands long before 
they were deemed fathers because the law could establish a biological con-
nection between man and child. In his Commentaries, William Blackstone 
wrote that the “main end and design of marriage . . . [is] to ascertain and fix 
upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, the mainte-
                                                                                                                           
 62 All but one state has a forced spousal share, thus preventing a testator from completely 
disinheriting a spouse, and only one state, Louisiana, has a forced child’s share, preventing a testa-
tor from completely disinheriting his (legitimate) children. See RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHER-
ITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 99 (2004). 
 63 See id. at 95. 
 64 See id. at 149 (“The inheritance rights between the adoptee and her adoptive parents, the 
adoptee and her birth parents, and the adoptee and her adoptive and biological relatives other than 
the parents, vary widely among the states.”). 
 65 See Labine, 401 U.S. at 541, 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 66 See id. at 552–53. 
 67 See Joseph Cullen Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REV. 22, 24 (1902). 
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nance, and the education of the children should belong.”68 Marriage exists, 
according to Blackstone, to determine parenthood.69 
If Justice Brennan really meant to invalidate marriage as the arbiter of 
parenthood then he was also bringing into question the parentage of an 
overwhelming majority of children in the country. Even today, when non-
marital birth rates are far higher than they were in 1971,70 the marital pre-
sumption is the most common way to determine parenthood in someone 
other than the birth mother.71 The best estimates suggest that the presumed 
father is not the biological father in 10–15% of those births.72 If the idea of 
using marriage as the arbiter of parenthood effects an impermissible dis-
                                                                                                                           
 68 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455 (1766) (emphasis added). 
 69 See id. The idea that the law can discern a biological parent-child relationship requires 
some faith in either (i) our ability to discern with specificity who had sex with whom and when 
(and exclusively enough) or (ii) genetic science. To the extent we ever had faith in the former we 
were probably far too optimistic about our judicial system. The state desire to collect child support 
payments from nonmarital fathers spurred the creation of the paternity suit, and thus the idea of a 
legal parent-child relationship outside of marriage. But the notion that the law could reliably es-
tablish the existence of a biological father-child relationship was, in most instances, idealistic. 
Such determinations were beyond science, and therefore law. See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining 
or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 6–7 (2004) (discussing the origins of the paternity suit). Only one person in Labine, 
the woman who gave birth to Ms. Vincent, could have known whether Ezra Vincent was the ge-
netic father of Ms. Vincent, and even that woman, if she had a variety of sexual experiences, may 
not have known. Relying on genetic science rather than questionable descriptions of sexual en-
counters makes for much more reliable evidence today, but our ability to reliably do so post-dates 
all of the Court’s legitimacy cases. See Jeffrey W. Morris & David W. Gjertson, Genetic Markers 
Used in Parentage Testing, 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 32:9 (David L. Faigman et al. 
eds., 2014) (discussing how much better current technology is at determining paternity than the 
previous generation of testing had been). 
 70 The nonmarital birth rate today is 41%; in 1970 it was 11%. See ELIZABETH WILDSMITH 
ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, CHILDBEARING OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE: ESTIMATES AND TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2011), http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Child_Trends-
2011_11_01_RB_NonmaritalCB.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z6QQ-GBU3]. 
 71 Sixty percent of the children born in this country are born to married women. See JOYCE A. 
MARTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS RE-
PORTS: BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2011, at 1, 3, 9 (June 28, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01.pdf [http://perma.cc/K2F4-ALSG]. All of these children are presumed to 
have legal fathers. See Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage for Same-
Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 467 (2012) (“The law in all states 
presumes that a husband is the father of his wife’s children and gives him the status of the chil-
dren’s legal father.”). 
 72 See Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking About Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 
36 FAM. L.Q. 49, 56–57 (2002) (“[T]he professional consensus is that the rate of paternal discrep-
ancy for couples in stable unions, whether legally married or cohabitating, is from ten to fifteen 
percent.”); see also Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the 
Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 221–22 (2002) (discussing 
the high occurrence of wrongly-attributed paternity). 
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crimination against nonmarital children, then the paternity of all legitimate 
children is suspect as well. 
Taken as a whole, the Labine decision suggests that at least five Justic-
es understood line drawing between potential family members in intestacy 
statutes to be an inevitably messy and probably arbitrary process. The idea 
that such distinctions in intestacy statutes could trigger added scrutiny be-
cause they interfered with a fundamental right to “intimate, familial rela-
tionship[s]”73 was tautological. Intestacy statutes were designed to define 
family relationships, or at least the family relationships that were going to 
get preference in probate proceedings. The dissent bypassed the fundamen-
tal rights quandary by arguing that distinctions based on legitimacy should 
be subject to heightened review due to the history of discrimination against 
illegitimates as a class. In doing so, the dissent necessarily drew into ques-
tion the predominant means of determining paternity—not blood, but mar-
riage. 
In 1972, in Weber,74 the Supreme Court retreated from the deference 
they endorsed one year earlier in Labine. In a notably lopsided opinion, 
which was 7–1–1 with Justice Harry Blackmun concurring, the Court struck 
down the Louisiana workers’ compensation scheme that provided benefits 
to some groups of dependents but did not allow unacknowledged illegiti-
mate children to collect.75 Legitimate children and spouses living with the 
deceased at the time of death were presumed dependent, and acknowledged 
illegitimate children had the opportunity to prove dependence.76 The plain-
tiff children in Weber did not fit into either category. The plaintiffs were 
living with the deceased, Mr. Stokes, just prior to his death. The household 
consisted of Mr. Stokes, his four legitimate children, his pregnant (apparent-
ly by him) companion Willie May Weber, and his one illegitimate child (al-
so conceived with Ms. Weber).77 Mr. Stokes was still married to his first 
wife, who had been committed to a mental hospital.78 Because he was still 
married to his first wife, Mr. Stokes had been unable to acknowledge his 
child with Ms. Weber because the Louisiana acknowledgement statute re-
quired parents acknowledging a child to be capable of contracting marriage 
at the time of conception.79 Justice Blackmun would have struck down the 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. 
 74 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. at 167–68. 
 77 See id. at 165. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 202 (1967). For a discussion of acknowledgement as an alter-
native means of establishing a legal parental relationship, see supra note 26 and accompanying 
text. 
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Louisiana scheme only to the extent that it barred Mr. Stokes from ever be-
ing able to acknowledge (and thereby make eligible) the children he had 
with Ms. Weber.80 
Justice Lewis F. Powell’s majority opinion went much further. It dis-
tinguished Labine as an intestacy rather than tort-related case.81 Finding 
Levy to be the controlling precedent, the Court then veered off the suspect-
class path that the dissent in Labine seemed to be heading down, and again 
rooted this case in fundamental rights doctrine: “The essential inquiry . . . is 
. . . inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classifica-
tion promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification 
endanger?”82 
The Supreme Court noted that the lower court had upheld the statute 
because it furthered the state’s interest in “protecting ‘legitimate family re-
lationships.’”83 But the Court dismissed that justification because it saw no 
indication that the state’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits to ille-
gitimate children would in any way discourage people from entering into 
“illegitimate” family relationships.84 There was just no proof that these stat-
utory distinctions affected anyone’s sexual behavior. 
The Court reasoned that there was no valid purpose for the exclusion 
of unacknowledged illegitimate children because the statute limited recov-
ery to dependent children:  
By limiting recovery to dependents of the deceased, Louisiana 
substantially lessens the possible problems of locating illegitimate 
children and of determining uncertain claims of parenthood. . . . It 
will not expand claimants for workmen’s compensation beyond 
those in a direct blood and dependency relationship with the de-
ceased and it avoids altogether diffuse questions of affection and 
affinity which pose difficult probative problems.85 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 176–77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun’s opinion 
corresponds with the “register to parent” rationale offered above. See supra note 45 and accompa-
nying text. He would have required states to allow parents to legally acknowledge their children, 
regardless of whether those children were born to a marriage or not. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 176–
77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 81 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 170–71 (majority opinion). 
 82 See id. at 173. 
 83 See id. (quoting Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 So. 2d 567, 570 (La. 1970), rev’d, 
Weber, 406 U.S. 164). 
 84 See id. at 173–74. 
 85 Id. at 174–75 (footnote omitted). 
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Limiting the class of entitled illegitimate children to those who were de-
pendent was important to the Court because of the proof problems inherent 
in determining biological paternity. 
The Court then suggested that because dependence limits recovery an-
yway, there was no reason to restrict the rights of nonmarital children.86 
“[D]irect blood and dependency”87 had to be a substitute for legitimacy. The 
Court explained: 
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages socie-
ty’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of 
marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant 
is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the il-
legitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual respon-
sibility or wrongdoing.88 
This well-meaning and oft-quoted passage89 makes little sense. The tort-
based and social welfare systems (as opposed to intestacy laws) that the 
Court deemed most worthy of scrutiny with regard to classifications of ille-
gitimacy all grant rights based on an adult’s economic position. Because 
such systems rely on extant labor markets and neoliberal entitlements with 
regard to property,90 what a child is burdened or blessed with legally is nev-
er a function of the child’s “individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”91 It is 
always a function of his or her parents’ behavior. 
Through no fault of his or her own, the child of a low-wage earner is 
entitled to much less in a wrongful death action than the child of a high-
wage earner because tort damages are based on the deceased’s expected 
income stream. A child’s social security survivors or disability benefits are a 
function of how much money the insured “parent” paid in Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes while working. The child whose mother 
never reported the income she earned while cleaning houses may be entitled 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See id. 
 87 Id. at 175. 
 88 Id.  
 89 See Amicus Brief of Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Windsor, supra 
note 1, at 22 (stating that Weber is “the most well-known and cited nonmarital status case”). 
 90 See generally Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal Implications 
of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing the privatization of children’s 
entitlements); Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-
Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (2015) (examining how 
constitutional law, state family law, and welfare law all take the market and its distribution of 
wealth as a given). 
 91 See Weber, 401 U.S. at 175. 
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to nothing, while the child whose mother worked for a cleaning service that 
automatically deducted her FICA wages is entitled to a benefit. A child 
whose mother had an affair with the gardener while married to an invest-
ment banker is financially secure for reasons that have nothing to do with 
that child.92 Moreover, in all of these cases, the child’s entitlements can de-
pend on how many siblings he or she has. Any one child’s social security 
payout,93 just like any one child’s allotment of child support,94 depends on 
the number of children with whom he or she is sharing the benefits. So not 
only is a child’s entitlement based on what his or her parent did in the mar-
ketplace, it is based on what his or her parent did in the bedroom. 
The real question for legitimacy doctrine must be, why it is appropriate 
to base a child’s entitlement on a parent’s market and reproductive behavior, 
but not appropriate to base a child’s entitlement on a parent’s marital behav-
ior? Why can’t parenthood be one of the rights and obligations of marriage? 
And why is the state not free to ignore genetic connections outside of those 
marital rights and obligations? After all, to do so arguably affords adults 
more sexual freedom.95 
C. Louisiana and Legitimacy 
The reader has likely noticed that all of the cases discussed thus far 
came from Louisiana. Various members of the Supreme Court appeared to 
be quite hostile to the Louisiana family law regime.96 There are two reasons 
the Court may have been particularly troubled by Louisiana’s Code. The 
first has to do with Louisiana being a southern state in the late 1960s with a 
                                                                                                                           
 92 A child born as a result of that affair would be considered the legal child of the investment 
banker and presumptively entitled to his or her legal father’s wealth. 
 93 For instance, if an insured deceased has two children and a widow, each of those children may 
receive less in social security survivors benefits than they would as a single child because of the 
maximum family amount. See Survivors Planner: How Much Would Your Survivors Receive?, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/planners/survivors/onyourown5.html [http://perma.cc/
6RSE-ZX7Y]. The more children one has, the more likely the potential recipient entitlements exceed 
the maximum family amount. 
 94 All states determine child support amounts in light of the number of children in a house-
hold. A custodial parent of a single child will receive more per child than for two children. See 
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 468–74 (explaining how child support formulas operate). 
 95 It affords more freedom because it allows people to have sex outside of marriage without 
having to worry about liabilities that might attach by doing so. Letting genetic connection serve as 
the primary means of establishing paternity for nonmarital children results in a strict liability re-
gime for men who have sex with unmarried women. Regardless of any representations on the 
woman’s part, and regardless of his wishes with regard to whether any unwanted pregnancy 
should be carried to term, he is liable for child support. See Baker, supra note 69, at 8–9 
(“[P]aternity law seems to be based on a strict liability theory for genetic contribution.”). 
 96 See, e.g., supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s inval-
idation of a Louisiana wrongful death statute because the state lacked a rational basis). 
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history of racial discrimination.97 The second has to do with Louisiana’s 
civil law traditions. 
With regard to potentially racist motivations explaining the Louisiana 
Code, there is ample evidence to suggest that southern states routinely 
tweaked their laws of domestic relations in order to ensure white suprema-
cy. In addition to their anti-miscegenation laws, which the Supreme Court 
had only recently struck down,98 there is evidence that southern states tried 
to eliminate common law marriage before many other states in an effort to 
render illegitimate all African-American children born to couples that had 
not gone through the formalities of marriage.99 Numerous states developed 
an exception to the marital presumption of paternity when the child was 
born with African-American features,100 thus rendering illegitimate children 
resulting from interracial extramarital affairs, but not those resulting from 
intraracial extramarital affairs. Moreover, as had been clear since the publi-
cation of the Moynihan Report, African-American children were far more 
likely to be born to nonmarital parents than were white children, so laws 
discriminating against illegitimate children would clearly have a dispropor-
tionate impact on African-Americans.101 All of those are strong reasons for 
the Court to have been suspicious of Louisiana’s laws with regard to legiti-
macy, but none of them indicate why Louisiana might be different from 
other southern states like Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. 
Louisiana was unique among its southern counterparts, though. Be-
cause of its continental origins, the Louisiana Code created many different 
categories of relevant family statuses and a variety of rights and obligations 
that attached to those different statuses.102 To a judge accustomed to the 
                                                                                                                           
 97 A disproportionate number of plaintiffs in the legitimacy cases were people of color. See 
Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 
107–10 (2003). 
 98 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (finding the prohibition of interracial 
marriage unconstitutional); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Justice Alito’s Dissent in Loving v. 
Virginia, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1605–06 (2014) (discussing various “uncertainty” arguments 
made by supporters of miscegenation laws regarding the possible consequences of interracial 
marriages, including for the children of such marriages). 
 99 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 351–53 (2012). 
 100 See Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power, 3 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495, 499–503 (1993) (arguing that nineteenth-century American courts 
did not apply the presumption in cases involving children with African-American features). 
 101 See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 5–12 (1965) (high-
lighting the higher rate of nonmarital births to African-American women and attributing much of 
the poverty in African-American communities to this family structure). 
 102 See Thomas W. Tucker, Sources of Louisiana’s Law of Persons: Blackstone, Domat and 
the French Codes, 44 TUL. L. REV. 264, 281–86 (1970). 
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common law system of other states, Louisiana’s Code would not only have 
looked odd, it could have looked like officious, liberty-reducing state inter-
ference with personal relationships, particularly those pertaining to sex. 
That is the kind of state interference against which the fundamental rights 
doctrine is supposed to protect. 
Viewed from the primarily French tradition from which it emerged, 
however, the Louisiana Code can be seen differently. As Charles Donohue 
has explained, the different family property systems in England and France 
can be traced to different feudal systems. The English system was biased in 
favor of simplifying ownership so as to facilitate development, whereas the 
French system was biased in favor of decentralizing power amongst large 
feudal families so as to check the monarchy’s control.103 The English sys-
tem enhanced individuals’ liberty while facilitating the growth of a strong 
centralized government. The French system enhanced family power, so as 
to restrict the growth of a strong centralized government. 
In order to ensure that property stayed in the family and away from the 
King, the French system developed elaborate rules that determined not only 
how property must be allocated among family members, but who should be 
considered family.104 It is this tradition that explains why Louisiana had 
“forced share” rules for both parents and legitimate children105 when the 
rest of the United States had neither. In Louisiana, legitimate children even 
had a right to a forced share of property that their father may have trans-
ferred during his lifetime, if he was found to have done so to reduce his le-
gitimate children’s interest.106 Because it mandated dissemination of proper-
ty throughout the family, the French legal system made family categoriza-
tion more relevant to more people. It mattered more whether one was a de-
scendent, sibling, or ascendant because all of those classes had property 
rights as family members, regardless of testator intent. In comparison, the 
British system vested almost complete control in the property owner. The 
intricacies of the French system required the law to do more work in defin-
ing family in order to distribute property. 
Although this system may have been different from those with which 
most of the Justices were familiar, it was not necessarily less progressive.107 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Charles Donahue, Jr., What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in 
England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 64–84 (1979). 
 104 See Tucker, supra note 102, at 275–76 (contrasting French and British systems and noting 
how a man’s relationship with his family was determined by law in France, but less so in Eng-
land). 
 105 See Labine, 401 U.S. at 536. 
 106 See id. 
 107 The marital rule of “community property,” which automatically vests both spouses with 
half of all property brought into a marriage, was also a part of that more communal system. Com-
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The French system prevented significant accumulations of wealth in heads 
of household, forced redistributions of wealth to those who might not be 
able to earn it, and acted as a check on state control. Louisiana may have 
discriminated against illegitimate children as opposed to legitimate children 
more than most states,108 but it also discriminated in favor of legitimate 
children as opposed to their parents more than most states. As one scholar 
has noted, Louisiana is an exception to the “American approach to testate 
succession [that] seems embarrassingly primitive compared with the wills 
law of most advanced countries.”109 Making a policy choice that protects 
marital children and reflects the child-protective inheritance norms of much 
of the rest of the industrialized world is not self-evidently irrational or nec-
essarily based on animus. 
D. Gomez and New Jersey Welfare: Per Curiam Protection 
Two brief per curiam opinions, neither from Louisiana, followed the 
year after Weber was decided. In 1973, in Gomez v. Perez, the Supreme 
Court ruled that Texas could not deny illegitimate children a right to support 
from their proven biological father because Texas law imposed upon marital 
fathers a duty to support their legitimate children.110 Citing Levy and Weber, 
the Court wrote that “a State may not invidiously discriminate against ille-
gitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children 
generally.”111 The Court did not expand on the level of scrutiny it was ap-
                                                                                                                           
munity property rules, because they vest wives with significantly more property than did the Eng-
lish common law system, are thought to be more progressive. Such rules have been adopted by all 
U.S. jurisdictions through the concept of equitable distribution for purposes of divorce. See HAR-
RIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 358–73. 
 108 Moreover, in all cases except the one involving the intestacy provision that the Court up-
held, Louisiana let acknowledgement serve as a substitute for legitimacy. See Labine, 401 U.S. at 
537. 
 109 BRASHIER, supra note 62, at 118–19. 
 110 See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). 
 111 Id. It is worth noting that it was not until 1984, when Congress required states to adopt 
income-based formulas for determining child support, that states began routinely treating unwed 
and wed fathers’ commitments to their children as comparable. See Child Support Enforcement 
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 3(c)–(g), 98 Stat. 1305, 1310–11 (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C. § 654 (2012)); Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103(a)–(b), 
102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2012)). As this author has noted 
elsewhere, the equities of this equal treatment are debatable. A man who was lied to about his 
sexual partner’s use of birth control, who always made clear that he had no interest in fathering a 
child, and who was promised that he would not be sued in paternity, has the exact same child 
support obligation, regardless of the fraud, as does a married man who demonstrated complete 
devotion to the idea of having children. See Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Hetero-
geneous Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 
U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 345. Gomez said that states must allow an unwed mother to sue in paternity, 
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plying or why it was applying it. In two later cases, Mills v. Habluetzel112 in 
1982 and Clark v. Jeter113 in 1988, the Supreme Court interpreted the right 
established in Gomez as requiring adequate time for a child to sue to estab-
lish paternity.114 
Also in 1973, in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, the 
Supreme Court struck down a state program that provided benefits to 
households of marital families with children, but not to households with 
children whose parents were not married.115 Citing Weber and the recently 
decided Gomez, the Court stated, “[T]here can be no doubt that the benefits 
extended under the challenged program are as indispensable to the health 
and well-being of illegitimate children as to those who are legitimate.”116 
What is curious about Cahill is that the state argument that had rou-
tinely failed previously—that providing benefits to legitimate but not ille-
gitimate children helped encourage marriage—seems far more credible in 
this case. It may seem farfetched that two people will marry so that if one of 
them dies or gets injured their children are entitled to benefits, but it is per-
fectly plausible that two people living in a household with children would 
marry in order for the household to qualify for governmental benefits. The 
payoff to marriage would be immediate. There is now ample evidence to 
support the idea that the payoff from marriage might be long lasting for 
children. Children from marital households fare better, on average, than 
children from nonmarital households.117 Married couples are more likely to 
stay together than unmarried couples, and stability is correlated with better 
                                                                                                                           
but it said nothing about the amount that courts had to award in child support. See Gomez, 409 
U.S. at 538. 
 112 See 456 U.S. 91, 100–02 (1982) (concluding that one year did not provide illegitimate 
children sufficient time to establish paternity and procure support). 
 113 See 486 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1988) (holding that a six-year statute of limitations on paternity 
suits by illegitimate children was unconstitutional). 
 114 As a practical matter, all of the child support cases are largely irrelevant today because 
federal legislation in 1984 tied federal child support dollars to rules requiring states to adopt eight-
een-year statutes of limitations for suits by a child or the state for child support. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(5) (1984). 
 115 See 411 U.S. 619, 620–21 (1973) (per curiam). 
 116 Id. at 621. 
 117 See Ryan Heath Bogle, Long-Term Cohabitation Among Unwed Parents: Determinants 
and Consequences for Children 1 (Bowling Green State Univ. Ctr. for Family & Demographic 
Research Working Paper Series, 2012), http://papers.ccpr.ucla.edu/papers/PWP-BGSU-2012-038/
PWP-BGSU-2012-038.pdf [http://perma.cc/W4MM-6D7J] (citing studies showing that children 
of cohabitating unions run a greater risk of disruption and have a greater risk of cognitive, behav-
ioral, and economic trouble than children of married counterparts). 
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child outcomes.118 Additionally, children are thought to benefit from the 
many incentives that the U.S. Tax Code provides to married couples.119 
As a policy matter, there are reasons to doubt whether strong-arming 
parents of nonmarital children who do not otherwise want to marry to do so 
would have the desired positive outcome on children.120 Moreover, marriage 
today has become such a classed institution that studies extolling its virtues 
are very hard to apply across classes.121 But legislators who believed in the 
benefits of marriage for children, and wanted to extend those benefits to 
children whose parents were not married, would not necessarily be acting 
out of animus toward illegitimate children in enacting legislation encourag-
ing marriage—quite the opposite. The Cahill and Gomez per curiam opin-
ions demonstrate a growing zeal to protect the rights of illegitimate children 
but a laxity in explaining why. 
E. The Final Quagmire 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided four more legitimacy cases in the next 
five years. The first two cases involved very similar social security provi-
sions, both of which were justified as meeting the needs of an insured’s de-
pendent children. The Court held that the social security disability provision 
in Jimenez v. Weinberger122 was unacceptable, but upheld the social security 
survivors’ provision in Mathews v. Lucas.123 In the final two cases, Trimble v. 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See id. at 2; see also Lisa A. Gennetian, One or Two Parent? Half or Step Siblings? The 
Effect of Family Structure on Young Children’s Achievement, 18 J. POPULAR ECON. 415, 431–33 
(2005) (for educational outcomes, children reared in traditional nuclear families do much better 
than those reared in other family structures); Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollak, Family Struc-
ture and Children’s Educational Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and Descriptive 
Regressions, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 671, 676 (2004); Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 403–05 (2007) (citing studies on the effects of 
family structure). 
 119 For a discussion of the preferential tax treatment afforded married couples, see Goodwin 
Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing and the 
Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1, 11–16. One of the most salient preferences that the 
Tax Code embraces is for non-working spouses, whose unpaid domestic labor is not taxed and 
whose dependence inures to the benefit of the wage-earning head of household. Presumably, this 
preferential treatment is rooted in a belief that children benefit from the unpaid labor that non-
wage-earning spouses provide. 
 120 People who do not marry may well not be marrying because they know that it would not 
work out. 
 121 See Kelly Musick & Larry Bumpass, Re-Examining the Case for Marriage: Union For-
mation and Changes in Well-Being, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1, 12 (2012) (noting that “it is very 
hard to disentangle marriage from other socioeconomic factors that may affect child well-being”); 
see also Bogle, supra note 117, at 7–8 (suggesting that data showing better outcomes for marital 
children may be deeply affected by socioeconomic factors). 
 122 See 417 U.S. 628, 636–38 (1974). 
 123 See 427 U.S. at 514–16. 
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Gordon and Lalli v. Lalli, the Court waded back into intestacy statutes, strik-
ing down one statute124 that was very similar to the one it had upheld in La-
bine, but allowing another that clearly discriminated against nonmarital chil-
dren.125 
1. Jimenez and Mathews 
The social security disability provision challenged in Jimenez allowed 
illegitimate children to collect disability-related children’s benefits as long 
as the children could inherit under state intestacy law or had been acknowl-
edged before the onset of the worker’s disability.126 Two of Mr. Jimenez’s 
acknowledged illegitimate children were ineligible for benefits under the 
statute because they were born after their father became disabled.127 The 
state intestacy statute, like the statute in Labine, did not list acknowledged 
illegitimate children as takers.128 Plaintiffs in Jimenez urged the Court to 
find that illegitimates constitute a suspect class, like race and national 
origin.129 The Court, in an 8–1 decision, explicitly eschewed that issue.130 
Instead, using what seems to be rational basis review, the Court simply 
found that the classification served “no legitimate state interest, compelling 
or otherwise.”131 
Oddly, the Court focused on the overinclusiveness of the statute.132 
The Court acknowledged that spurious claims could be a problem, so it did 
not suggest that it was impermissible to exclude children born after the inju-
ry occurred. But the Court did find it impermissible to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate children born after the injury.133 Legitimate chil-
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774–76 (1977). 
 125 See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273–75. 
 126 See Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 634–35 (also noting that the provision granted benefits to chil-
dren who were illegitimate solely because of a “formal, nonobvious defect” in their parent’s mar-
riage). 
 127 See id. at 628. 
 128 See id. These children could only have been legitimated if Mr. Jimenez had divorced his 
first wife and then married the children’s mother. As was the case in Weber, the Court did not 
seem to entertain this as a realistic option for the father. See id.; see also supra notes 74–88 and 
accompanying text (discussing Weber). 
 129 See Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 631. 
 130 See id. (stating that the Court did not need to discuss the suspect classification argument). 
 131 Id. (citation omitted). 
 132 See id. at 636–37. The overinclusiveness that the statute engendered, by providing for all 
heirs delineated in the state intestacy statute, seemed to bother the Court as much as the underin-
clusivenss engendered by the fact that the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to prove depend-
ence. 
 133 See id. The Court reasoned that the statute could not have been designed to meet the de-
pendency needs of all of those children impacted by their parent’s disability because it allowed 
legitimate children born after the injury—who thus could not have been dependent before the 
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dren born after the injury could collect because they were listed as heirs in 
the intestacy statute, but after-born illegitimate children could not collect. It 
was the government’s willingness to rely on the intestacy statute in addition 
to birth at the time of injury that resulted in impermissible discrimination. 
Two years later, in Mathews, the Supreme Court upheld an identically 
overinclusive but less underinclusive statute. In a 6–3 decision, the Court let 
pass a social security survivors benefit test that provided for all heirs listed 
in the applicable state’s intestacy statute, as well as any “child” who could 
prove his or her dependence on the deceased at the time of death.134 The 
children in Mathews had lived with their “father” for thirteen and six years, 
respectively, but he was not living with or supporting the children when he 
died.135 The Court relied on the state’s intestacy statute to determine which 
children could take at death and thus excluded the deceased’s nondependent 
genetic children.136 
Mathews is most well known, though, for clarifying the level of scrutiny 
standard in legitimacy cases. The Court rejected the strict racial analogy be-
cause “discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity 
or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against 
women and Negroes. . . . [T]he Act’s discrimination between individuals on 
the basis of their legitimacy does not ‘command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process.’”137 Nonetheless, the Court held that 
                                                                                                                           
injury—but not illegitimate children born after the injury to collect. See id. The government ar-
gued that the disallowance of the illegitimate children born after the injury was necessary to dis-
courage spurious claims. See id. at 636. 
 134 See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 514–16. No child was eligible for benefits if they had been 
adopted by someone else. An adoption exception like this makes common sense because the chil-
dren are now considered to be in a different parent-child relationship, but it also sheds light on 
how genetic connection can often be subordinated to legal status when it comes to entitlement. A 
child adopted by someone else has just as much of a blood connection to the insured as a child 
who is not adopted. The statute excludes adoptees even if they have been completely abandoned 
by their adoptive parent. It is the fact that they have been legally declared to be a part of another 
parent-child relationship that disenables them, but the Court spends no time explaining why the 
government is free to disallow a child who has been adopted, but not a child whose parents were 
never married. 
 135 See id. at 497, 501. 
 136 See id. at 500–01. 
 137 See id. at 506 (citation omitted) (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
28 (1973)). The liberal dissenters, confronting their first defeat since Labine, again emphasized the 
analogy to race: “We are committed to the proposition that all persons are created equal.” See id. 
at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural 
to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too 
much of our history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white.” Id. at 
520. If more rigorous scrutiny was applied, the statute should fail for its overinclusiveness. The 
statute allows all legitimate and acknowledged children, as well as children of men who have been 
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illegitimates were a semi-suspect class, entitled to a “not toothless” level of 
scrutiny because of the history of discrimination against them.138 It is not the 
idea of drawing lines around family but the history of discrimination against 
illegitimate children that triggers the added scrutiny, though the statute that 
barred recovery for the illegitimate children in Mathews survived that scrutiny. 
2. Trimble and Lalli 
The intestacy cases that followed two years later did little to clear up 
the inconsistencies between Jimenez and Mathews. In 1977, in Trimble, the 
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois intestacy statute that allowed 
illegitimate children to collect from their genetic mothers but not their fa-
thers, ostensibly in order to promote legitimate family relationships and the 
orderly distribution of property.139 The deceased in Trimble had been adju-
dicated as the father and was paying child support when he died, but the 
child was still considered illegitimate under state law and ineligible to take 
in probate.140 The Illinois Supreme Court, believing Labine to be precedent 
requiring deference to legislative decision making in intestacy because of 
the important state interest in establishing a “method of property disposi-
tion,” upheld the statute.141 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the state’s in-
terest in “the accurate and efficient disposition of property” could not justify 
the exclusion of the child in this case.142 The only thing that distinguishes 
this case from Labine is the child support order. In Trimble, as in Labine, 
there were no disputed facts regarding genetic connection and no reason to 
believe that the deceased would not have wanted his estate to go to his 
acknowledged daughter.143 Either nine years of battling over this issue or 
the existence of the court order establishing paternity convinced enough 
members of the Court that the state was not free to disregard a previously 
established legal parent-child relationship, even in an intestacy statute. 
In his dissent, Justice William Rehnquist wrote a more in-depth ver-
sion of the dissent he had penned in every previous case invalidating the 
                                                                                                                           
adjudged responsible in a paternity hearing, to collect even though many of those children are “no 
more likely to be ‘dependent’ than are the children in appellees’ situation.” Id. at 522. 
 138 Id. at 509–10 (majority opinion) (holding that classifications based on illegitimacy should 
be reviewed with a level of scrutiny that was “not toothless”). 
 139 See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774–76. 
 140 See id. at 764–65. 
 141 See In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 238–42 (Ill. 1975), abrogated by Trimble, 430 
U.S. 762. 
 142 See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772–73. 
 143 The Court in Trimble cited these factors as proof that the statute was discriminatory. See 
id.; see also Labine, 401 U.S. at 533–34. 
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illegitimacy distinction. He recited the history of the Equal Protection 
Clause, argued that it was meant only to apply to race, and thoroughly dis-
missed the idea that a classification like legitimacy might demand more 
scrutiny than any other routine piece of legislation.144 To anyone who has 
read Justice Rehnquist’s previous dissents, there is nothing surprising in 
these arguments. What is surprising is that three other Justices were willing 
to join him. Justices Potter Stewart, Warren E. Burger, and Blackmun all 
voted to invalidate the statutes at issue in Jimenez and Weber, and had 
signed onto the “not toothless” review standard in Mathews.145 Their will-
ingness to join Justice Rehnquist in Trimble may suggest that their real mo-
tivation was a belief in the “intestacy exceptionalism” that the Court had 
used earlier to distinguish Labine from Levy and Weber.146 
One year after Trimble, in Lalli,147 the Supreme Court upheld a New 
York intestacy statute that prevented illegitimate children from inheriting 
from their alleged fathers unless “a court of competent jurisdiction ha[d], 
during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation.”148 Justice Pow-
ell switched sides in Lalli, determining that the New York statute included 
all that was required of it under the Equal Protection Clause.149 Justice 
Blackmun concurred in the result, but only after making clear that he 
thought Lalli overruled Trimble.150 Justice Rehnquist concurred in the 
judgment for reasons expressed in his Trimble dissent, his opus on how all 
distinctions based on legitimacy should pass muster under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.151 Justices Powell, Stewart, and Burger were the only Justices 
who thought Lalli was different enough from Trimble to find the holdings 
consistent.152 Misters Trimble and Lalli had both publicly, though informal-
ly, acknowledged their illegitimate children and had both provided for 
them—at least somewhat—in their youth, but in Trimble there had been a 
legal adjudication of paternity and in Lalli there had not. The critical differ-
ence was a previous legal finding of parenthood. 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 779–82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The kinds of means-ends 
analysis that the Court attempted in cases like this was fruitless, according to Rehnquist, because it 
was simply impossible to discern legislative purpose. See id. 
 145 See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509–10; Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 631; Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76. 
 146 See supra notes 50–51, 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s distinctions 
between Labine, Levy, and Weber). 
 147 See Lalli, 439 U.S at 273–75. 
 148 See id. at 261–62. 
 149 See id. at 274–76. 
 150 See id. at 276–77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 151 See id. at 276 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 152 See id. at 273–76 (majority opinion). 
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Despite—or perhaps because of—the fairly impenetrable distinctions 
and justifications offered by the Justices in the last four legitimacy cases, 
the Supreme Court’s foray into legitimacy classifications came to a rather 
abrupt end after Lalli.153 
Ultimately, this Article argues that there is no one theory that can unify 
all of the legitimacy cases. It also suggests that what is likely the most 
common and intuitive interpretation of the legitimacy cases—that they con-
fer constitutional status on the genetic relationship, allowing blood to trump 
law in establishing parenthood—is the most dangerous interpretation of the 
cases. But before examining why that is so, a brief discussion of what the 
trajectory of the legitimacy cases says more generally about equal protec-
tion doctrine and family status determinations is in order. 
F. Of Suspect Classes and Fundamental Rights 
Notwithstanding the early attempts to identify illegitimacy discrimina-
tion as a problem stemming from fundamental rights to family relationships, 
Mathews, followed by Trimble and Lalli, dispensed with that line of analysis. 
Illegitimates constitute a suspect class because of a history of discrimination 
against them. The four most liberal Justices never succeeded in getting illegit-
imacy to be reviewed as strictly as race, but it is the history of discrimination 
rather than the idea of family that triggers the “not toothless” review. 
The question of which constitutional doctrine, fundamental rights or 
group discrimination, entitles one to family status may be recognizable to 
those familiar with the same-sex marriage debate. The right to same-sex 
marriage might be lodged in fundamental rights doctrine (there is a funda-
mental right to marry) or group discrimination doctrine (gays and lesbians 
should be treated as a suspect class). Although the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the “synergy between the two protections,”154 the Court’s recent deci-
sion in 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, clearly eschewed a group discrimina-
tion finding.155 The opinion did not suggest that gays and lesbians should be 
treated as a suspect class. Thus, the Supreme Court aligned more with the 
Tenth and Fourth Circuits, which found the right to same-sex marriage root-
ed in fundamental rights, and less with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, 
                                                                                                                           
 153 As discussed, there were two later statute of limitations cases pertaining to child support. 
See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. The authority of those cases is questioned infra 
notes 237–240 and accompanying text. 
 154 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 155 See id. at 2598–602 (discussing fundamental right to marry); id. at 2603–05 (discussing 
equality principles but never mentioning suspect-class analysis). 
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which found the right to same-sex marriage rooted in discrimination doc-
trine.156 The legitimacy cases suggest this may have been a mistake. 
The legitimacy cases reveal that pressure on the states’ classifications of 
parenthood stemmed from the same kinds of sources that put pressure on 
states’ classifications of marriage. Children who were not entitled to various 
social welfare benefits tied to the parent-child relationship sued just as same-
sex couples sued over the social welfare benefits tied to marriage.157 In the 
same-sex marriage cases, many courts found no compelling reason to exclude 
same-sex couples from the benefits that straight couples received.158 Compa-
rably, the Supreme Court often found no sound reason to exclude certain 
children from the benefits that legitimate children received. In both contexts, 
after toying with the idea that the problem is interference with a fundamental 
right to family status (either marriage or a parent-child relationship), many 
courts backed away from fundamental-rights analysis because of the govern-
ment’s inevitable role in defining family. 
The Supreme Court has found a fundamental right to marry in only two 
cases that could not otherwise be decided on group discrimination grounds: 
one involving men too poor to pay child support and one involving prison 
inmates.159 In finding a fundamental right to marry in both cases, the Court 
was assuming a definition of marriage that incorporated most of the extant 
governmental regulation of marriage. Thus, neither of those cases explains 
why the state must allow indigent men to marry their third cousins but not 
their first cousins.160 Nor do they clarify why an inmate has a right to marry 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (comparing different decisions regarding the 
right to marry from these circuits). 
 157 See Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights: The Growing, 
Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend to Disaggregate Family Status from Family 
Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 135 (2010) (discussing how same-sex couples who could not marry 
pressured employers to treat them as legally related so as to allow them to access health insurance 
and other social welfare benefits). 
 158 See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215 (N.J. 2006) (listing the extensive array of 
benefits that are made available to married couples); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969 (holding that 
the Commonwealth may not deny the benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999) (“[T]he State is constitutionally required to extend to 
same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage.”). 
 159 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 98–100 (1987) (prison inmates); Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374, 389–90 (1978) (men unable to pay child support). See generally Loving, 388 U.S. 1 
(spending the vast majority of the opinion explaining why anti-miscegenation laws constituted 
racial discrimination and then three final short paragraphs suggesting a fundamental right to mar-
ry). For further discussion, see Baker, supra note 157, at 142. 
 160 In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that prohibited 
men who were in arrears in child support payments from marrying unless they could certify that 
they would always be able to provide for their children. See 434 U.S. at 389–90. It was a ridicu-
lously over- and underinclusive statute, and one that was highly unlikely to achieve its purpose. 
The slightest amount of scrutiny should have invalidated the statute at issue. Perhaps realizing 
 
2015] Legitimate Families and Equal Protection 1675 
one person at a time but not two.161 Incest and polygamy are to a “funda-
mental right to marry” what the intestacy cases became to legitimacy doc-
trine: thorns in the side of fundamental-rights analysis. Routine governmen-
tal regulation of family status undermines fundamental rights claims to that 
status. 
Some scholars have argued that the right to marriage is best under-
stood as an expressive right, cabined by the social meaning of marriage.162 
Because it is so important to people to be able to express themselves by 
embracing the institution of marriage, the argument goes, the government 
may not arbitrarily restrict marital status. But for a right to marry to make 
sense, there must be some agreement on the meaning of marriage. As Cass 
Sunstein has written, “[T]he expressive benefits of marriage are contingent 
on a particular constellation of social norms; there is nothing inevitable 
about them.”163 
Comparably, for illegitimate children to have a right to a legally recog-
nized parent-child relationship, there must be some agreement on what that 
relationship is. There is nothing inevitable about a genetically related child’s 
right to be considered part of a particular parent-child relationship. Historical-
ly, as discussed, the legal paternal relationship was rooted in marriage. If one 
argues from tradition, it would appear that the marital nongenetic child has a 
much stronger claim to a legal parent-child relationship than does the non-
marital genetic child. Living patterns well into the nineteenth century, in both 
the United States and Europe, show scant support for even an ideal of a bio-
logical family.164 Informal adoption and fostering played prominent roles in 
                                                                                                                           
that, the Court paid very little attention to the scope of the “right to marry” that it was using to 
strike down the statute. See id. at 377–78. The Court did, however, counsel that “[b]y reaffirming 
the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regula-
tion which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny.” Id. at 386. 
 161 In Turner v. Safley, the Court invalidated a Missouri provision that barred prison inmates 
from marrying. See 482 U.S. at 98–100. Relying significantly on the expressive content of mar-
riage, the Court again found, with very little explanation of the scope of the right, that the state 
had almost nothing to gain in prohibiting prisoners from marrying. See id. at 97–99. But almost all 
of the reasons that the Court gave for finding a fundamental right to marry, such as that it could be 
an “expression[] of emotional support and public commitment” or an “exercise of religious faith 
as well as an expression of personal dedication,” could be used to justify a right to polygamous 
marriage as well. See id. at 95–96. 
 162 See Baker, supra note 157, at 144–47; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2098 (2005). 
 163 Sunstein, supra note 162, at 2098. 
 164 See Signe Howell, Changes in Moral Values About the Family: Adoption Legislation in 
Norway and the US, 50 SOC. ANALYSIS 146, 152–53 (2006); see also JOHN R. GILLIS, A 
WORLD OF THEIR OWN MAKING: MYTH, RITUAL, AND THE QUEST FOR FAMILY VALUES 
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establishing households and dependence.165 Even for mothers, there was not 
necessarily an assumption that nurturing followed biology.166 Parenthood is 
no more fixed a concept than is marriage. 
“Fundamental personal rights”167 that derive from “intimate familial 
relationship[s]”168 presuppose an understanding of what is family. Those 
understandings are not static, but evolve with changing social norms. Thus, 
it is difficult to define either parenthood or marriage in a manner that can 
give full content to those fundamental rights. The inability—or unwilling-
ness—of the Supreme Court to define legal parenthood may explain why it 
chose group-based discrimination rather than fundamental rights as the rea-
son for added scrutiny in the legitimacy cases. The use of fundamental 
rights rather than group-based discrimination in the marriage context may 
ultimately force the Court to limit the “personal choice regarding marriage” 
that it said was so central to the fundamental right itself.169 Or else, it must 
be willing to mandate legal recognition of some forms of marriage—like 
incest and polygamy—that are well outside contemporary norms.  
II. THE PRIMACY OF BLOOD 
Applying that group-based discrimination doctrine in the legitimacy 
context seems to lead to the conclusion that a state must treat the genetic 
children of an adult as it treats the marital children of that adult: except in 
intestacy cases, genetic parenthood must be considered equal to or superior 
to legal parenthood. This Article refers to this as the Primacy of Blood theo-
ry. The analysis that follows explains and unpacks the Primacy of Blood 
theory in order to show, first, that it does not adequately explain the legiti-
macy cases as written, and second, that it is inconsistent with a growing 
body of contemporary family law. 
A. Blood Trumping Law? 
The cases that best exemplify the Primacy of Blood theory are the ma-
ternity cases (Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liabil-
ity Insurance Co.) and the child support cases (Gomez v. Perez and its prog-
                                                                                                                           
152–56 (1996) (describing various routine practices, including fosterage, foundling hospi-
tals, and giving children to the church, that bely the inevitability of the biological family). 
 165 See Howell, supra note 164, at 149. 
 166 See id. (“[T]he connection between giving birth and giving nurture, of equating biological 
maternity with motherhood, was not generally made in Europe until the nineteenth century.” (cit-
ing GILLIS, supra note 164)). 
 167 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 173. 
 168 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. 
 169 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589. 
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eny). The Supreme Court held that the nonmarital children in Levy and 
Glona had a right to be treated as marital children based on an averred ge-
netic connection.170 In the child support cases, the Court held that an illegit-
imate child had a constitutionally guaranteed right—by virtue of his or her 
genetic connection—to establish legal parenthood for purposes of child 
support, because marital children were entitled to rely on a legal parent-
child relationship for child support.171 The Court’s analysis in these cases 
assumed that illegitimate children have entitlements stemming from genetic 
connection and genetic connection alone. 
In other contexts, the Court seemed eager to acknowledge the im-
portance of genetic connection but only if it could be proved adequately. 
Mere assertions of genetic connection in the context of paternity were not 
enough to establish parenthood, even if those assertions were uncontested. 
What the Court needed in order to find that the Constitution required recog-
nition of a particular genetic connection was an averment of connection and 
action on the father’s part consistent with that genetic connection.172 Thus, 
the reason the Court required states to let dependence act as a substitute for 
legitimacy in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. and Jimenez v. Wein-
berger was that it thought a man would not provide for children who were 
not his own genetic issue. Dependence was a proxy for the DNA tests that 
were unavailable at that time. 
Mathews v. Lucas is a bit difficult to square with this theory, but not if 
one thinks that the Court was wary of the reason why Mr. Mathews may have 
abandoned his children. If Mr. Mathews had died four years earlier, his chil-
dren could have collected social security survivors benefits because their ge-
netic father (Mr. Mathews) was still living with them. Because their father 
left, the children could not establish dependence. The Court in Mathews may 
have thought that Mr. Mathews’s leaving established enough doubt about the 
genetic connection to justify the state in not recognizing the parent-child rela-
tionship.173 
New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, the 1973 Supreme 
Court per curiam decision requiring that nonmarital households be treated 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 68, 72 (1968). 
 171 See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537–38 (1973) (per curiam); see also supra notes 
110–111 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s holding in Gomez v. Perez). 
 172 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 
U.S. 164 (1972). 
 173 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). Admittedly, this is a bit of a stretch. It is 
commonplace for formerly married fathers and other men who have no doubt as to their genetic 
connection to fail to provide support for their children. So Mr. Mathews’ leaving is perfectly con-
sistent with him being the genetic father. 
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as marital households for purposes of welfare benefits, also suggests that 
the Court believed in the constitutional importance of genetic connection.174 
As discussed, there were many ways a state might have reasonably justified 
a program that provided disproportionate benefits to marital over nonmari-
tal households; the U.S. Tax Code routinely does so.175 That the Court dis-
missed any such arguments with a per curiam opinion suggests that it 
thought that genetic connection trumped any policy arguments in favor of 
encouraging marriage. 
The only cases that are impossible to square with the primacy of genetic 
connection theory are the intestacy cases. Labine v. Vincent, Lalli v. Lalli, and 
Trimble v. Gordon all condone statutory discrimination against nonmarital 
children.176 In intestacy, the state is free to let law be the defining feature of 
parenthood, regardless of genetic connection. But the intestacy statutes might 
be excused as exceptional. In the means-ends analysis that typifies equal pro-
tection doctrine, one can expect different means to be upheld in different con-
texts, depending on the ends of the statute. Because the purposes of intestacy 
are different than the purposes of tort law and social welfare provisions, per-
haps the state can use different means of determining who should be granted 
rights. Moreover, the American tradition has always allowed parents to disin-
herit their children in a will.177 Perhaps the Constitution does not mandate that 
intestacy statutes protect illegitimate children because probate law in general 
pays so little heed to children’s rights or needs.178 The Court suggested this 
kind of intestacy exceptionalism when it first distinguished Labine from Levy 
and then distinguished Weber from Labine.179 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See 411 U.S. 619, 620–21 (1973) (per curiam); see also supra notes 22–153 and accompa-
nying text (examining the various justifications provided by states for granting benefits solely to 
legitimate children). 
 175 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (exploring benefits provided to married cou-
ples by the U.S. Tax Code). 
 176 See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261–62 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 769, 771–72 
(1977); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 538–40 (1971). In Trimble v. Gordon, the deceased had 
already been adjudicated the father in paternity proceedings. What the Court found problematic 
was the inconsistent treatment of established fatherhood, not law necessarily trumping blood. See 
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771–72. 
 177 See BRASHIER, supra note 62, at 91. 
 178 Ironically, the state in which this argument is least persuasive is Louisiana, the one state 
that does provide children with a forced share, thus protecting children’s rights. See supra notes 
108–109 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra notes 50–51, 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s differentia-
tion of the legitimacy cases). 
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B. The Problems with Blood 
There are two significant problems with reading the legitimacy cases 
as endorsing the Primacy of Blood theory. The first stems from how poorly 
an intestacy exceptionalism distinction stands up under scrutiny. The second 
stems from how inconsistent the Primacy of Blood theory is with the 
emerging law of parenthood. 
1. Intestacy Exceptionalism 
Recognizing the different statutory purposes served by the various 
programs at issue in the legitimacy cases provides a means of distinguishing 
the intestacy cases from the other legitimacy cases. But, upon examination, 
it is a distinction without a difference. The fit between the perceived statuto-
ry purpose and the class of people entitled to take in all of the statutes at 
issue in the legitimacy cases is arbitrary, just as inevitably in tort and social 
welfare contexts as in the intestacy context. 
In tort, government benefit, and intestacy statutes, the state delineates 
classes of people who are entitled to some right by virtue of their family 
connection to the person or incident at issue. The purpose of delineating 
that class of takers in tort statutes is thought to be compensation and deter-
rence. In the governmental benefits cases, the purpose of classifying takers 
is to meet the needs of dependents. In the intestacy context, delineating tak-
ers is supposed to honor the presumed intent of the deceased. Those differ-
ent statutory purposes cannot explain the Court’s unique treatment of illegit-
imacy in the context of intestacy. 
Consider the tort-based cases previously discussed. One of the factors 
that made the first Supreme Court legitimacy case, Levy, so sympathetic 
was that the statute’s intended deterrent function could not be served—there 
was no one else in the class of potential beneficiaries if the unacknowl-
edged, illegitimate children could not sue for wrongful death.180 As the 
Court noted, the tortfeasor could have escaped all liability.181 As decided, 
though, Levy suggests that genetic issue must be able to take even if the de-
terrent function had been adequately served. If Ms. Levy had birthed two 
legitimate and three illegitimate children, the Court’s holding would have 
done nothing other than expand the class of recipients and diminish the enti-
tlement of the legitimate children. That is exactly what happened in We-
ber.182 The workers’ compensation statute had a recovery cap which the 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Levy, 391 U.S. at 68–70. 
 181 See id. at 71. 
 182 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 167. 
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four legitimate children had reached. In concluding that the illegitimate 
children had a right to collect, the Supreme Court ordered the legitimate 
children to share; it did nothing to increase the deterrent effect of the stat-
ute.183 
Any tort-based statute that delineates a class of takers will be inevita-
bly over- and underinclusive for purposes of deterrence. It will list more 
than enough people than are necessary to ensure a full deterrent effect be-
cause recovery will be limited by the earnings loss of the injured. It will 
also list fewer people than may be necessary for effective deterrence in any 
given instance because the victim may not have close relatives or “depend-
ents.” 
Nor can the mandatory recovery that the Court imposed in the tort cas-
es be understood as necessary compensation. As mentioned in the discus-
sion of Levy, while the Court seemed moved by how much Ms. Levy cared 
for and nurtured her children, and how dependent they were on her, the 
Court clearly was not requiring states to rewrite their wrongful death stat-
utes to allow anyone who might have been hurt by the death of the victim to 
recover.184 If Ms. Levy had “taken in” all five of those children, or if Mr. 
Stokes had lived with Ms. Weber and her existing children without having 
any of his genetic children with her, none of the dependent children would 
have been entitled to compensation in either case, though they undoubtedly 
would have been hurt by their functional parents’ deaths.185 
Comparably, in the government benefit context in which the govern-
ment argued that the statutory purpose was to meet dependencies created by 
an accident or injury, the class of takers was inevitably over- and underin-
clusive. Indeed, the statutes in Jimenez and Mathews were identically over-
inclusive: both listed legitimate children, regardless of their dependence, in 
the class of potential takers.186 In logic that is difficult to follow, the Court 
found such overinclusiveness impermissible in Jimenez but permissible in 
Mathews. 
The social security statutes were also underinclusive. Mr. Jimenez might 
well have been providing for his paramour’s children from another relation-
                                                                                                                           
 183 See id. at 173–74. 
 184 See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. Ms. Levy’s employer, the neighbors that 
she routinely helped with child care, and her siblings all might have been able to show financial 
loss from her death, but it would have been extraordinary for the Court to hold that the Constitu-
tion required those individuals to be eligible to sue for wrongful death. 
 185 Nongenetically related children might have been completely dependent on Ms. Levy but 
have no claim in wrongful death, just as Ms. Weber’s children might have been completely de-
pendent on Mr. Stokes but have no claim to his benefits. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 173–74; Levy, 
391 U.S. at 72. 
 186 See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 514–16; Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 636–37. 
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ship. Men routinely provide, both financially and emotionally, for the chil-
dren in the household in which they live, regardless of their genetic connec-
tion.187 Contrary to what the Court may have presumed about men’s likeli-
hood to support only their own genetic issue, sociological evidence suggests 
that men create dependencies in nongenetically related children with frequen-
cy.188 Is a social security statute, the purported purpose of which is to meet 
dependencies, free to ignore those dependencies? Put another way, why were 
the programs, for which the government argued that the statutory purpose was 
to alleviate hardship caused to children who were “dependent,” linked to 
parenthood? Is not dependence best addressed by determining dependence? 
What does a parental link have to do with such a statute? 
More comprehensively, the Court failed to grasp that the social welfare 
programs at issue in these cases were either general welfare statutes aimed 
to address the needs of children hurt by a worker’s death or incapacity—in 
which case the statutes were far too underinclusive because genetic connec-
tion is often irrelevant to dependence—or social welfare programs best con-
ceptualized as mandatory public insurance programs for workers. Perhaps 
social security and workers’ compensation programs operate as mandatory 
life and disability insurance programs that the worker purchases with with-
holdings from his or her paycheck. In such programs, one would think that 
the beneficiaries entitled to the insurance proceeds should be the ones 
whom the worker would likely designate as beneficiaries given the oppor-
tunity, just as intestacy statutes try to mimic a testator’s presumed intent. 
But if it is permissible for a state to presume that a testator would rather 
take care of his or her marital children at the expense of nonmarital chil-
dren, why is it impermissible for the Social Security Administration to pre-
sume the same thing? 
Ultimately, the statutory purposes in all of these contexts collapse into 
each other. They all involve situations in which the government has to de-
lineate a group of takers from a theoretically infinite pool. In doing so, it 
will always include some who are seen as particularly deserving and ex-
clude some who are not. 
What is perhaps most surprising about the legitimacy cases is that the 
Court was able to see this inevitable arbitrariness in the intestacy context, 
but not in other contexts. Intestacy statutes, by their nature, implicate the 
two strands of equal protection—fundamental rights and suspect classifica-
tion—that trigger judicial scrutiny. The purpose of intestacy statutes is to 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 26–31, 204 (2000) (elaborating on 
male patterns of “serial parenting”). 
 188 See id. 
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label as family, and therefore takers, some list of people at the expense of 
others. That is what intestacy statutes do: they define family. Then, intesta-
cy statutes discriminate—on purpose—between family members.189 They 
create an order of takers, some of whom will be treated better by the law 
than others.190 
If the real problem in the legitimacy cases was that a class of people 
who had endured stigma and a history of discrimination could not be sin-
gled out for differential treatment, then why are intestacy statutes free to 
discriminate in favor of first cousins, with no history of stigma or mistreat-
ment, over illegitimate genetic offspring? Why is the Social Security Ad-
ministration free to treat abandoned legitimate children better than aban-
doned illegitimate children as in Mathews? 
Perhaps it was the sheer transparency of the way in which intestacy 
statutes might trigger scrutiny that made the Supreme Court retract into def-
erence. Only when the government maintained it was doing something oth-
er than defining and discriminating between family members did the Court 
find the discrimination problematic.191 That is a thin reed on which to hang 
the constitutional stature of the genetic connection.192 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting how the Louisiana statutes arbitrarily 
discriminated against various family members). 
 190 If intestacy law differs from probate law because probate in general pays so little heed to 
children’s rights, whereas in other contexts the statutes were designed to help children, then Loui-
siana should be the one state that was not free to discriminate in intestacy. See supra notes 177–
178 and accompanying text. Its probate laws were far more protective of children than were most 
of the country’s, but the Court upheld Louisiana’s discrimination against illegitimate children in 
intestacy. See Labine, 401 U.S. at 538–40; supra notes 102–109 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Louisiana’s laws). 
 191 In Weber and Jimenez, the government maintained that it was providing for children who 
had been dependent on the deceased and used legitimacy as a proxy for dependence. See Jimenez, 
417 U.S. at 636–37; Weber, 406 U.S. at 173–74. The Court was concerned that legitimacy was a 
bad proxy for dependence—which it may be—but so is genetic connection. See supra notes 171–
174 and accompanying text. 
 192 The Primacy of Blood theory also leaves in limbo children who are legitimate by virtue of 
having been born into a marriage, but are genetically unrelated to the mother’s husband. As indi-
cated above, this is a sizable number of children. See Ellman, supra note 72, at 56–57 (“[T]he 
professional consensus is that the rate of paternal discrepancy for couples in stable unions, wheth-
er legally married or cohabitating, is from ten to fifteen percent.”). Law, not blood, has determined 
parenthood for these children. Does a marital child have a constitutional right to sue for wrongful 
death if his or her genetic, nonmarital father is tortiously killed? Or a right to sue a (wealthier) 
genetic, nonmarital father for child support even though that child also has those entitlements 
through the marital father? Or is the discrimination that illegitimate children have suffered just a 
result of having only one (or no) legal parental relationship? If the problem is not having two legal 
parents, then the possibility of acknowledgement should solve any of the discrimination problems. 
But that is not consistent with the Court’s holding in Levy, when the Court held that the children 
had rights derivative from the mother even though she had not acknowledged them. See Levy, 391 
U.S. at 69–72. 
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But there is a bigger problem with the Primacy of Blood theory: it un-
dermines most of the contemporary movements to transcend traditional, bina-
ry, heterosexual norms of parenthood. The next subsection explains why. 
2. Modern Parenting 
Despite the availability of genetic testing today, most parents do not 
establish their legal parental status by proving genetic connection. They 
establish parental status through legal presumptions, formal acknowledge-
ments, or contract. The two most common ways of establishing parenthood 
in someone other than the birth mother193 are the marital presumption and 
the Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity (“VAP”).194 Both of these pro-
cedures can be viewed as proxies for genetic connection, placeholders of 
sorts that establish parenthood unless someone proves otherwise with genet-
ic evidence.195 But the marital presumption and voluntary acknowledgments 
are increasingly viewed as independent sources of parenthood. The legal 
constructs of marriage and acknowledgement can only serve as independent 
sources of parenthood, though, if the legitimacy cases do not preference 
genetic connection. 
a. The Marital Presumption 
The marital presumption, which disregards genetic connection and us-
es the legal construct of marriage to assign parental status, is at the heart of 
legitimacy doctrine. Construed conclusively, as it used to be, it can also pro-
tect the parental status of same-sex couples. 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Birth mothers are presumed parents in most states, but that presumption can be overcome 
in states that enforce gestational surrogacy contracts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 
786–87 (Cal. 1993) (finding that the surrogacy contract trumped the gestational surrogate’s claim 
to motherhood by virtue of having given birth to the child). The Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act 
states, “Except as provided in this Act, the woman who gives birth to a child is presumed to be the 
mother of that child.” See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 / 15 (2014). The statute then goes on to vest 
motherhood in the intended mother if the requirements of the Gestational Surrogacy Act are met. 
See id. / 15(a)–(b)(1). 
 194 See Harris, supra note 71, at 469. 
 195 June Carbone and Naomi Cahn have suggested that the marital presumption has tradition-
ally been used in this way. They argue that “[m]arriage is an institution historically designed to 
promote the biological family.” See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining 
the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1011, 1019 (2003). William Blackstone’s position linked parenthood to marriage, but did not 
indicate that biology was relevant. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at *455. 
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i. Lesbian Couples 
The marital presumption makes the spouse of the woman who gives 
birth the other parent of the child, regardless of the source of the semen. As 
genetic science has grown more reliable, and as marriages grow less sta-
ble,196 the conclusiveness of the presumption has waned. Most state parent-
age acts allow a man outside a marriage to sue to establish genetic paternity 
or a marital father to sue to disestablish paternity.197 Genetic connection does 
not always trump the marital presumption in these cases, but it can.198 
As a matter of equality, using genetic connection to trump the marital 
presumption is problematic. If same-sex married couples are to be seen as 
similarly situated to opposite-sex married couples with regard to parenthood, 
then the conclusiveness of the marital presumption should be welcomed.199 If 
genetics can trump the legal construct, then same-sex couples will never be in 
the same position as heterosexual couples because they cannot reproduce bio-
logically. Same-sex couples need a conclusive law in order to ensure that ge-
netics is irrelevant. 
Applying the genetic connection so strictly impacts some straight cou-
ples as well. It reinvigorates the power of the marital bargain by taking 
away the privilege that genetic science has more recently afforded spouses 
who either want to relinquish parental responsibility or deny an ex-spouse 
parental rights. State parentage acts that make genetic connection relevant 
allow some husbands to disestablish their paternity when they can prove 
that they are not the genetic father of the child,200 and allow mothers to at-
tempt to deny husbands custody or visitation by establishing a lack of ge-
                                                                                                                           
 196 When married couples get divorced, there is a tendency for both wives and husbands to 
question paternity that had gone unquestioned before. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 195, at 
1065–67 (noting that divorcing spouses often seek DNA evidence to establish or disestablish ge-
netic connections to children). DNA testing makes it possible to ask and answer a question that 
was left unasked for years because there was no way of ascertaining a reliable answer. See supra 
notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 197 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45 / 7–8 (2014). 
 198 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy 
in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 234–37 (2006) (surveying state court re-
sponses to contests between genetic connection and the marital presumption). 
 199 Some jurisdictions have codified the applicability of the marital presumption to lesbian 
couples. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-909(a-1)(2) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2014). 
Other states have validated the marital presumption judicially. See, e.g., Della Corte v. Ramirez, 
961 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S. 2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 
2014). 
 200 See, e.g., Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 83–84 (Md. 2000) (holding that a husband was 
not estopped from challenging child support during a divorce, based on evidence that he was not 
the genetic father); In re C.S., 277 S.W.3d 82, 86–87 (Tex. App. 2009) (allowing a husband to 
challenge legal paternity with genetic evidence). 
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netic connection.201 A strong marital presumption takes away parties’ ability 
to use genetic evidence as a sword in this way.202 
Biological parents in same-sex relationships have also used genetics as 
a sword, though gay and lesbian rights groups have worked consistently to 
rebuff those attempts. LGBT groups often take sides in disputes between 
genetic and nongenetic parents, and they take the side of the nongenetic 
parent.203 They recognize the need to diminish the lingering importance of 
genetic connection. The more comfortable judges are in thinking about 
parenthood as a legal construct, the stronger the marital presumption will be 
and the more protection there will be for lesbian couples as parents. 
ii. Gay Male Couples 
For gay men, the marital presumption is less likely to be important, 
though it still could have some applicability. A gay man who has married 
someone who had entered into a surrogacy contract before the marriage 
should be a parent by virtue of his marriage to the legal parent at the time of 
the child’s birth. Although theoretically possible, this situation is not likely to 
be common. If there is a surrogacy contract, the safest way to ensure dual 
parenthood for the gay couple will be to make both intended parents parties to 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1995). 
 202 This is a loss for those who have tried to use genetic evidence as a sword, though there is 
tremendous variation in how different state statutes and courts handle these issues. Many states 
place a statute of limitations on disestablishing parenthood, even though federal law prevents them 
from putting a statute of limitations on establishing parenthood. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
45 / 8(a)(3) (“An action to declare the non-existence of the parent and child relationship . . . shall 
be barred if brought later than 2 years after the petitioner obtains knowledge of relevant facts.”). 
Thus, often, genetic evidence can make someone a parent, but cannot necessarily relieve that per-
son of parental status. When confronted with DNA evidence presented within a statute of limita-
tions, courts have used different approaches to determine paternity. Some courts use a best-
interest-of-the-child standard to find paternity, thus considering both marriage and genetics as 
relevant but not determinative factors in determining paternity. See Appleton, supra note 198, at 
235 n.35. Other courts use finality doctrine or a best-interest-of-the-child analysis to dismiss 
claims for genetic testing, thus rendering it irrelevant. See Baker, supra note 69, at 14. 
 203 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494 (N.H. 2014); McGaw v. McGaw, 
No. WD 77799, 2015 WL 4910657, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). In these cases, Gay & Lesbian Ad-
vocates and Defenders (“GLAD”) and Lambda Legal Defense Fund, respectively, represented a 
nonbiological mother in attempts to secure parental rights when her ex-partner was trying to exclude 
the nonbiological mother based on lack of genetic connection. In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 
A.3d at 496; McGaw, 2015 WL 4910657, at *1; see also GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFEND-
ERS, PROTECTING FAMILIES: STANDARDS FOR LGBT FAMILIES (2011), http://www.glad.org/uploads/
docs/publications/protecting-families-standards-for-lgbt-families.pdf [http://perma.cc/5PGD-YVUS] 
(outlining GLAD’s position and encouraging potential claimants and lawyers to respect families as 
they function, rather than as they may be defined biologically). “We believe (as with ducks) that if it 
looks like a family, if it holds itself out as a family, and if it functions like a family, then it is a fami-
ly.” See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, supra. 
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the contract. Thus, the spouse would become a parent by virtue of contract, 
not marriage. Comparably, in adoption situations, the practice has always 
been for married couples to both adopt simultaneously, not to have one party 
adopt and have the other assume parenthood by virtue of the marriage. Thus, 
gay men are less likely to ever have to rely on the marital presumption.204 
They will need to rely on other legal constructs rather than biology. 
b. Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity 
The second most common way for parenthood to be established in 
someone other than the birth mother is through a Voluntary Acknowledge-
ment of Paternity. The VAP leaped into prominence as a means of establish-
ing parenthood by congressional fiat. As part of its continuing effort to bet-
ter privatize the dependency of children who could be entitled to welfare 
benefits, Congress directed all states to develop a system that would try to 
ensure that two parents were identified for every child born.205 This required 
identifying, as soon as possible, men who might otherwise be sued in pater-
nity. If no legal father is presumed at birth, federal law requires that hospi-
tal-based programs be implemented to attempt to secure presumptive fa-
thers’ signatures “immediately before or after the birth of a child.”206 
These forms routinely ask men to aver that they are the biological fa-
ther of the child,207 but that is a rather ridiculous request. Assuming the 
slightest degree of sexual freedom on the mother’s part, and assuming the 
couple did not use cutting-edge DNA testing in utero,208 the men who sign 
VAPs are guessing or just hoping that they are the genetic fathers. Or, per-
haps, these men are signing up for fatherhood regardless of whether they 
are genetically related. One independent study found that when given the 
opportunity for DNA tests to establish the genetic connection definitively, 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Lesbian couples are more likely to rely on the marital presumption than gay men because 
sperm banks routinely act as an intermediary, thus eliminating any direct contracting between the 
progenitors of gametes and the intended parent(s). A sperm donor’s parental rights are extin-
guished in his contract with the sperm bank, so he never has to “transfer” those rights to the in-
tended parent(s). 
 205 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (2012). 
 206 See id. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii). 
 207 See, e.g., Acknowledgement of Paternity Affidavit, IDAHO DEP’T HEALTH & WELFARE, 
http://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Health/VitalRecordsandHealthStatistics/VitalRecords/tabid/
1506/ItemId/5616/Default.aspx (click on “Acknowledgment of Paternity Affidavit (English)” under 
Special Forms) [http://perma.cc/K923-MHG9] (sample VAP for Idaho); Voluntary Acknowledge-
ment of Parentage, COMMONWEALTH MASS., http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/cse/parents/voluntary-
ack-of-parentage-form.pdf [http://perma.cc/CK88-BVQG] (sample VAP for Massachusetts). 
 208 There is a possibility that soon noninvasive in utero testing will be able to reveal the genet-
ic progenitors of a fetus. See Xin Guo et al., A Noninvasive Test to Determine Paternity in Preg-
nancy, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1745 (2012). 
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most men refused.209 Many courts are growing increasingly comfortable 
with treating VAPs as final, legal judgments, regardless of what the genetic 
evidence might show.210 
Because most states drafted their VAP forms to include an averment of 
biological connection, gay and lesbian couples do not tend to use VAPs to 
establish parenthood. But as Professor Leslie Harris has argued, Congress 
did not mandate that the VAP be tied to genetics,211 so there is no reason for 
nongenetically related adults to be deprived of the right to voluntarily 
acknowledge parenthood—unless the legitimacy cases do not allow law to 
trump genetics. If the legitimacy cases must be read to elevate children’s 
right to genetic connection, it would be problematic for nongenetically re-
lated adults to routinely bind themselves and certain children to a legally 
final parent-child relationship. The ability to bind oneself to a parent-child 
relationship regardless of genetic connection is necessary if unmarried gay 
or lesbian parents are to be entitled to the same parental avenues as unmar-
ried straight parents. 
c. Reproductive Technology Contracts 
Contract law and its corollary, the “intent to parent” standard,212 are 
now routinely used to secure parental status in all people who seek to pro-
duce a child using gametes from people other than the intended parents. The 
efficacy of these contracts in trumping genetic connection as sources of 
parenthood is crucial to the success of these contracts. 
i. Excluding Others 
In the standard artificial insemination contract, a sperm donor signs 
away whatever rights and obligations his genetic connection to the child 
might engender.213 The inseminated woman relies on the donor’s intent to 
abandon parental rights and obligations when she purchases the semen. A 
gestational surrogate mother signs away whatever rights her gestational 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See Harris, supra note 71, at 477. 
 210 See id. at 481–82. As Professor Harris has suggested, if VAPs were truly treated as final 
judgments, then the success of any challenge to a VAP would require the challenger to have per-
formed due diligence before he signed his name to something that was potentially untrue. Given 
the availability of DNA evidence, men would not likely succeed in these challenges. See id. at 
478. But courts are increasingly wary of disrupting the finality of VAPs with genetic evidence, 
particularly if much time has passed since birth. See id. at 481–82. 
 211 See id. at 478–86. 
 212 For more on how the intent to parent standard operates see Baker, supra note 69, at 26–30 
(describing the intent to parent standard in the context of reproductive technology contracts). 
 213 See id. 
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contributions engender.214 The intended parent(s) of a child born through 
surrogacy rely on the surrogate’s intent to abandon parental rights and obli-
gations when the intended parent(s) assume parental status.215 
To this author’s knowledge, no one has ever pursued an illegitimacy-
based constitutional challenge to the enforcement of a contract for gametes 
or reproductive services,216 but the child support cases suggest that such a 
claim has merit.217 If the state cannot distinguish between marital and non-
marital genetic fathers with regard to their child support obligations because 
the child has the right to support based on genetic connection, how can the 
state deny a child the right to support from a sperm donor? It is now com-
mon for single women and single men, gay and straight, to use reproductive 
contracts to become single parents by choice. Such a regime discriminates 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 / 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 (laying out specifications for an 
enforceable surrogacy contract). A gestational surrogate may be carrying an embryo fertilized by 
two genetic parents who intend to be legal parents; an embryo fertilized by one genetic parent and 
one “donor,” only one of whom intends to be a legal parent; or an embryo fertilized by two do-
nors, neither of whom intend to be a legal parent. In “traditional” surrogacy contracts, the surro-
gate is carrying an embryo consisting of her own egg and the sperm of the intended father. In that 
contract, the surrogate signs away both whatever rights and obligations her genetic connection to 
the child might engender, and whatever rights and obligations her gestational contribution might 
engender. 
 215 Some people argue that the law should not necessarily shut the genetic parents out; it 
should just expand the number of parents recognized. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, 
MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 192 (2014) 
(arguing that “[i]t is therefore time to acknowledge the potential involvement of multiple adults in 
a child’s life”); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for 
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 
880–81 (1984) (examining why considering parenthood as a means of excluding others does not 
reflect the reality of modern families); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Tradi-
tional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
309, 332–38 (2007) (advocating for the recognition of multiple parentage). Even if the law were to 
move toward a non-binary regime for parenthood, the parties in these contracts would want to 
secure superior parental status so as not to have to share substantive parenting decisions with those 
with whom they might disagree. For a general discussion of the issues involved with multiple 
parenthood, see Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. 
L. REV. 649, 705–11 (2008). 
 216 Some men have challenged statutes that deny parenthood for semen donors (as long as 
certain conditions are met) as violative of constitutional gender equality and due process. See In re 
K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039–41 (Kan. 2007); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243–46 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1989). These challenges have not been successful. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1044; 
McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 246. 
 217 Most state legislatures responded to the introduction of artificial insemination by passing 
statutes making clear that children born through such procedures were legitimate children of the 
intended mother’s marriage, so long as a doctor participated in the insemination. See KARA W. 
SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY 225–26 (2014). Doctors were not in the practice of inseminat-
ing single women until relatively recently. See id. at 228. 
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against the resulting child based on “the circumstances of their birth.”218 
Children born through these reproductive contracts are not fillius nullius, 
but they are fillius unus, as were almost all of the children in the legitimacy 
cases. 
One less than satisfactory way to reconcile the child support cases with 
reproductive technologies is to posit that children produced through hetero-
sexual intercourse have more of a claim to genetic connection than do chil-
dren born through reproductive technologies.219 As a policy matter, this 
asymmetry might be explained as the state being more concerned with the 
reckless reproduction through intercourse, than the reckless reproduction of 
children through contracts.220 But it is hard to see why the means of concep-
tion can affect the substantive constitutional rights of children if the marital 
status of their parents cannot. 
ii. Including Others 
Intended parents also rely on contracts and an intent to parent standard 
to try to confer parental rights. These arguments often surface in the cases 
mentioned previously, when biological parents try to exclude ex-partners 
based on their lack of genetic connection.221 To combat that argument, the 
nongenetically related parent produces evidence that the biological parent 
fully intended to share parental rights. Sometimes this evidence is based on 
documentation such as co-executed parenting agreements and guardianship 
provisions.222 Sometimes intent is inferred from a functional relationship.223 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See Amicus Brief of Family and Child Welfare Law Professors challenging DOMA, supra 
note 1, at 20. 
 219 Susan Appleton argues that recent artificial insemination cases prove that legitimacy doc-
trine is more concerned with regulating sex than with children’s entitlements. That is why legiti-
macy doctrine has not had much to say about reproductive technologies. See Appleton, supra note 
99, at 375. 
 220 Moreover, even when men are careful to contract away their rights and obligations before 
intercourse and make clear their intentions not to be parents, courts refuse to endorse the contract. 
Those courts reason that the right to receive support is the child’s right and not one that either 
parent can contract away. See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (refusing to enforce a written, signed, pre-intercourse agreement that relieved the genetic 
father of parental responsibilities); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 715 (N.Y. 1983) (hold-
ing that a genetic father’s clear intent not to parent and the mother’s fraud in representing that she 
was using birth control did not relieve him of an obligation to support the child). 
 221 See supra notes 200–216 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that genetic evi-
dence can be used as a “sword” to challenge the parental rights of a nongenetic parent). 
 222 See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321–22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding intent to 
parent expressed in guardianship papers, a medical consent authorization, and a co-parenting 
agreement). Admittedly, courts seem hesitant to foist parental status on someone who does not 
want it, even though there is evidence that her or she intended to become a parent. See T.F. v. 
B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1253–54 (Mass. 2004) (refusing to use an intent to parent standard to hold 
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The critical question is usually whether the established parent intended to 
share parental rights or keep them exclusively for him or herself.224 
Courts are most receptive to honoring an intent to parent when it is re-
flected in a functioning relationship. As one scholar has explained, claims 
with regard to intent can be contested and the most effective way to prove 
intent to share parenting is with evidence that the adults did in fact co-
parent.225 Thus function and intent are often coterminous. State courts’ ea-
gerness to honor function in finding parental status mirrors the Supreme 
Court’s eagerness to honor functioning illegitimate families.226 Honoring 
function through an intent standard limits the unruly problems associated 
with function (or dependence) as the sole determiner of parenthood because 
there must be a finding of intent in addition to a functional relationship,227 
but it relies on contract—a quintessentially legal construct—to establish 
parenthood. It also suggests that children’s rights to a particular parental 
relationship are a function of what his or her “parents” agreed to, which is 
not very different than suggesting that a child’s rights are a function of 
whether his or her parents agreed to marry. In both cases, the child’s 
“rights” are necessarily limited by the behavior of his or her parents, and it 
is up to the state to determine whether the parents’ conduct suffices to estab-
lish a parent-child relationship.228 
                                                                                                                           
an ex-partner liable for child support even though she participated in the planning process for 
having the child); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that 
using intent as the standard would invite too many “elusive factual determinations”). 
 223 See Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases: 
Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 658–59 
(2012). 
 224 For a discussion of these cases among same-sex couples, see generally Jenni Millbank, 
The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian Mother Litigation in the Era of the Eternal Biological 
Family, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 149 (2008). 
 225 See Ball, supra note 223, at 657–61. 
 226 With the exception of the child support cases, in all of the Supreme Court cases that found 
in favor of illegitimates, the adult with whom the children claimed a legal relationship functioned 
as a parent. Thus, one might suggest that the cases best reflect the constitutional import of func-
tion, not blood or law. There are two problems with using function as the operative constitutional 
standard. First, as discussed, this theory would confer constitutional rights on nieces, nephews, 
second cousins, and neighbors’ children, all of whom might exist in a functional family that is not 
bound by genetics. See supra notes 184–190 and accompanying text (discussing the inevitable 
problem with over- and underinclusiveness). Second, it seems odd to hold that a child’s constitu-
tional right depends on whether his or her parents abandoned the functioning family. Under a 
functional test, the abandoned child, who has already presumably suffered because of abandon-
ment, is entitled to fewer constitutional rights because of that abandonment. 
 227 See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text for discussion of the unruliness of func-
tion as a standard for parenthood. 
 228 It is no answer to say that the parent-child relationship should be established or not based 
only on the adult’s relationship to the child. Parentage actions often have to be decided before 
relationships get a chance to develop—so that adults can sue to enforce their parental right to have 
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III. THE PRIMACY OF LAW 
If, in support of equality for same-sex couples, the incorporation of re-
productive technology contracts, and other evolving understandings of 
parenthood, one wants to reject the primacy of genetic connection interpre-
tation of the legitimacy cases, is there another way to make sense of them? 
Yes. Most of the legitimacy cases can be read as accepting robust state 
power to define parenthood, as long as the state is consistent in letting law, 
not blood, define parenthood. This Article refers to this as the Primacy of 
Law theory. 
The intestacy cases discussed previously,229 Labine v. Vincent, Trimble 
v. Gordon, and Lalli v. Lalli, are not outliers. They are the foundation of the 
doctrine, which holds that the law does not have to honor a genetic connec-
tion between adult and child, but if the law has already used that genetic 
connection to establish a parent-child relationship for some purposes, it 
must be careful before it ignores it for others. Because Mr. Trimble had 
been adjudged the father of the child (in order to make him liable for child 
support), the intestacy statute had to treat the child as it would his other 
children who were recognized in law.230 States should not be free to distin-
guish between marital children and acknowledged nonmarital children for 
whom the parent-child relationship is established. So in Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, Mr. Jimenez’s acknowledged nonmarital children should have been 
able to collect because they were acknowledged, not because it is impermis-
sible to distinguish between marital and nonmarital genetic children.231 
States must also be careful in how they restrict adults’ abilities to 
acknowledge children under this theory.232 Thus, the problem in Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. was not the workers’ compensation statute that 
distinguished between legally recognized parent-child relationships (marital 
                                                                                                                           
a relationship develop. Adults also sometimes get called away from children for work, family, or 
other exigencies. Part of what legal parental status secures is an ability to leave one’s child tempo-
rarily, secure in the knowledge that one’s status as parent cannot be taken by someone else. 
 229 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Labine v. 
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
 230 See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764–65. 
 231 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635 (1974) (explaining that the plaintiffs had 
been acknowledged by Mr. Jimenez). 
 232 Under this theory, the government could not arbitrarily deny an adult the right to recognize 
a parent-child relationship, though fully articulating the parameters that might be appropriate be-
fore one was allowed to acknowledge parenthood is beyond the scope of this Article. A state 
might, for instance, restrict the number of adults who could establish a parent-child relationship to 
two and require acquiescence by all existing parents, but it would not necessarily have to do so. 
For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of keeping the limit at two and minimizing 
parental disagreement, see Baker, supra note 215, at 674–76 (discussing how states have an inter-
est in children having more than one parent, but not necessarily too many parents). 
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and acknowledged children) on the one hand, and extralegal adult-child re-
lationships on the other.233 The issue, as Justice Blackmun asserted, was the 
acknowledgement statute that restricted Mr. Stokes from establishing a par-
ent-child relationship.234  
Dependence is not necessarily a proxy for a DNA test. The government 
benefit cases may appear to say that dependence must be allowed to act as a 
substitute for a legal determination of parenthood, but the idea of depend-
ence as a substitute for law may be nothing more than an accident of argu-
mentation. If the social welfare statutes in Weber and Jimenez had limited 
their beneficiaries to those who could take under state intestacy statutes, the 
idea of dependence might never have surfaced. “It is too hard and costly,” 
the defenders of such statutes could have argued, “to decide, in any given 
instance, which children should be entitled to the benefits that might flow 
from any given adult. Therefore we use the intestacy statute as a proxy for 
who should take.” 
There is nothing in any of these cases suggesting that this rationale 
would run afoul of the Constitution. The incorporation of the intestacy stat-
ute would not have been overinclusive in Jimenez if the state had never in-
troduced dependence as a variable. The problem, according to the Court, 
was that some nondependent legitimate children could collect, but if de-
pendence had not been used as a justification for the statute, the inclusion of 
that group would not have been a problem. The Social Security Act’s reli-
ance on the intestacy statute in Mathews v. Lucas was upheld.235 The state 
does not have to incorporate genetic connection into law, but if it goes be-
yond already established legal relationships and allows some other metric 
(genetic connection plus dependence, for instance) to serve as qualification 
for entitlement, then it must allow all children the opportunity to prove that 
qualification. 
Thus, despite the oft-quoted language in Weber, the rights of illegiti-
mate children per se—that is, the constitutional rights of children who have 
a genetic connection to an adult to have the law recognize that genetic con-
nection as a parent-child relationship—are really quite limited; one might 
even say such rights are nonexistent.236 Illegitimate children only have 
rights if the state has tried to expand the class of takers to include genetical-
                                                                                                                           
 233 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174 (1972). Mr. Jimenez had also 
acknowledged his two illegitimate children, born after his injury. See Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 630. 
 234 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 176–77 (Blackmun, J., concurring); supra note 80 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Mr. Stokes’s inability to legally acknowledge his illegitimate children due to 
the Louisiana acknowledgment statute). 
 235 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 514–16 (1976). 
 236 See Weber, 401 U.S. at 175.  
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ly related children. If the state establishes entitlements based on something 
other than established legal constructs like marriage or acknowledgement, it 
must do so even-handedly. Biology can be relevant, but only if the state 
chooses to make it so. 
A. The Problems with Law Over Blood  
This Primacy of Law theory is not perfect. It inadequately explains 
both the maternity cases and the child support cases. In Levy v. Louisiana 
and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., the Supreme 
Court held that the nonmarital mother-child relationships had to be treated 
as marital parent-child relationships even though there was no prior legal 
declaration of a parental relationship and no finding of dependence.237 It is 
very difficult to square Levy and Glona with the intestacy cases and 
Mathews. The Court concluded that the children in Levy must be able to sue 
for malpractice because marital children would have been able to, but if the 
tort claim had failed for any reason, those children would not have been 
entitled to take in intestacy, even though marital children would have. The 
children in Mathews lived with their father as long as the children in Levy 
lived with their mother, but they were not entitled to social security benefits 
stemming from their father’s death, even though the children in Levy were 
entitled to wrongful death benefits stemming from their mother’s death.238 
Unlike the mother in Levy, the father in Mathews abandoned the children, 
but that hardly seems like a rational reason to disallow the child’s entitle-
ment if that entitlement is rooted in genetic connection. 
The other line of cases that is exceedingly difficult to square with a Pri-
macy of Law theory is the child support cases.239 The child support cases say 
that children must be given adequate time to establish a parent-child relation-
                                                                                                                           
 237 See Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 73–76 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68, 69–72 (1968). 
 238 See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 515–16. One might argue that it is maternal exceptionalism that 
explains Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. more 
than intestacy exceptionalism that explains Labine v. Vincent and Lalli vs. Lalli. The Court has 
previously held that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated with regard to parental rights, so 
perhaps illegitimate children have different rights to relationships with their mothers than they do 
with their fathers. For a discussion of the well known line of unwed fathers’ rights cases finding 
that mothers and fathers have different due process and equal protection rights to parenthood, see 
Baker, supra note 157, at 148–50. The Court has also used biological differences between men 
and women during gestation and at birth to condone the automatic conferral of citizenship on the 
genetic children of American mothers, but not necessarily on the genetic children of American 
fathers. See, e.g., Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 54 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). 
 239 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); 
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). 
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ship for purposes of child support. Traditionally, paternity was established 
without paying any heed to actual dependence. Indeed, it was established in 
order to create dependence. But if the state must provide a forum for estab-
lishing genetic connection for purposes of child support, why does it not have 
to provide a forum for purposes of intestacy or social security benefits, which 
might well involve larger payoffs? The children in Mathews were constitu-
tionally entitled to sue their dead father’s estate for child support because 
marital children would have been able to, but they were not entitled to sue the 
Social Security Administration for survivors benefits even though marital 
children would have been able to do so. In general, the Court seemed far 
more concerned with securing nonmarital children’s rights to child support 
than nonmarital children’s rights to any other form of benefit. This may make 
sense from a public fisc perspective,240 but it does not make much sense from 
an equal protection perspective. 
CONCLUSION 
There is simply no way to reconcile all of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
legitimacy cases with each other. Intestacy exceptionalism does not with-
stand scrutiny, and even if it did, one would be left with Mathews v. Lucas, 
which announced the “not toothless” level of scrutiny but then proceeded to 
apply a standard without much tooth. In the end, one must choose between 
the Primacy of Blood and the Primacy of Law theories based on which 
holdings one is must comfortable dismissing. 
The Justices who championed the rights of illegitimate children may 
well have thought they were dismantling a system of legal classification 
that was rooted in moral, caste-based judgments of what families “should” 
look like. They were trying to provide a world of entitlements for children 
who had been classified by the law as outside the group of children the state 
actually protects and insures. Although this cause may have seemed noble, 
the Justices likely embarked on a task they could not complete. To the ex-
tent some Justices wanted to rely on genetic connection, rather than mar-
riage, to determine parenthood, they were really just replacing one caste-
based system with another.241 
                                                                                                                           
 240 As indicated earlier, the child support cases are practically irrelevant today because federal 
statute requires states to provide an eighteen-year statute of limitations for establishing parenthood—
though it does not say that the establishment of parenthood must be rooted in genetics. See supra note 
111 and accompanying text. 
 241 As Appleton has observed, “We can probably eliminate the last vestiges of illegitimacy . . . 
only by dismantling parentage altogether.” Appleton, supra note 99, at 385. 
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The idea that certain children cannot be excluded from a parent-child 
relationship because they share a genetic connection with the adult, through 
whom certain state-facilitated entitlements flow, undermines contemporary 
movements to recognize family forms that are not and could not be rooted 
in genetic connection. The interpretation of the constitutional legitimacy 
cases that most conforms to contemporary understandings of parenthood is 
one that makes parenthood a question of law, not blood, and gives the state 
considerable discretion in defining parenthood. The more robust that discre-
tion is, the weaker are any “fundamental rights” arguments to a parent-child 
relationship. The fundamental right to a parent-child relationship, like the 
fundamental right to marry, is necessarily limited because of the state’s 
power to define those statuses. 
Laws that discriminate against illegitimate children, like laws that dis-
criminate against same-sex couples, may be subject to some heightened 
scrutiny because of a history of discrimination. But in the illegitimacy con-
text, advocates should be careful in explaining why children are being treat-
ed unfairly. As the amici briefs in the same-sex marriage litigation demon-
strate, parties still use the legitimacy cases, and they use them in support of 
propositions that are either (i) silly—that all children must be treated 
alike242—or (ii) dangerous—that all of an adult’s genetically related off-
spring must be treated alike. For those interested in expanding contempo-
rary understandings of legitimate parenthood, it is important to emphasize 
how the legitimacy cases cannot stand for the first proposition and need not 
be read to stand for the latter. If there is a constitutional problem with the 
state failing to recognize a parental relationship, it is not rooted in a re-
quirement that the state recognize genetic connection. Rather, it is rooted in 
a much lesser requirement that a state must be consistent in its decisions to 
treat particular children as legally in a relationship with particular adults.
                                                                                                                           
 242 The principle that all children must be treated alike may not be silly, but it is unrealistical-
ly idealistic. It would require dismantling almost all of the state-administered programs that cur-
rently provide for children, including child support statutes, social security disability and survivors 
provisions, workers’ compensation regimes, and tort law. See supra notes 90–94 and accompany-
ing text. 
  
 
 
